


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GREEK HISTORY

Its Problems and its Meaning

WITH APPENDICES ON THE AUTHORITIES
and on
"THE CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS"

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NOTE.

This book consists of a reprint of the articles "*Greece, History of,*" and "*Constitution of Athens,*" which appeared in the eleventh edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. My sincere thanks are due to the proprietors of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* for giving me permission to republish them.

A Chronological Table has been added.

E.M.W.

I.

INTRODUCTORY.

IT is necessary to indicate at the outset the scope and object of the present work. The reader must not expect to find in it a compendious summary of the chief events in the history of ancient Greece. It is not intended to supply an "Outlines of Greek History." A sketch of Greek history is not possible in the sense in which a sketch of Roman history, or even of English history, is possible. Greek history is not the history of a single state. When Aristotle composed his work upon the constitutions of the Greek states, he found it necessary to extend his survey to no less than 158 states. Greek history is thus concerned with more than 150 separate and independent political communities. Nor is it even the history of a single country. The area occupied by the Greek race extended from the Pyrenees to the Caucasus, and from southern Russia to northern Africa. It is inevitable, therefore, that the impression conveyed by a sketch of Greek history should be misleading. A mere narrative can hardly fail to give a false perspective. Experience shows that such a sketch is apt to resolve itself into the history of a few great movements and of a few leading states.

INTRODUCTORY.

What is still worse, it is apt to confine itself, at any rate for the greater part of the period dealt with, to the history of Greece in the narrower sense, *i.e.*, of the Greek peninsula. For the identification of Greece with Greece proper there may be some degree of excuse when we come to the 5th and 4th centuries. In the period that lies behind the year 500 B.C. Greece proper forms but a small part of the Greek world. In the 7th and 6th centuries it is outside Greece itself that we must look for the most active life of the Greek people and the most brilliant manifestations of the Greek spirit. We shall, therefore, be concerned with the causes and conditions of events, rather than with the events themselves; we shall attempt analysis rather than narrative. Our object will be to indicate problems and to criticize views; to suggest lessons and parallels, and to estimate the importance of the Hellenic factor in the development of civilization.

II.

THE MINOAN AND MYCENAEAN AGES.

When does Greek history begin? Whatever may be the answer that is given, it will be widely different from any that could have been proposed a generation ago. Then the question was, How late does Greek history begin? To day the question is, How early does it begin? The suggestion made by Grote that the first Olympiad (776 B.C.) should be taken as the starting-point of the history of Greece, in the proper sense of the term "history," seemed likely, not so many years ago, to win general acceptance. At the present moment the tendency would seem to be to go back as far as the 3rd or 4th millenium B.C. in order to reach a starting-point. It is to the results of archaeological research during the last fifty years that we must attribute so startling a change in the attitude of historical science towards this problem. In the days when Grote published the first volumes of his *History of Greece* archaeology was in its infancy. Its results, so far as they affected the earlier periods of Greek history, were scanty; its methods were unscientific. The methods have been gradually perfected by numerous workers in the field; but the results which have so profoundly modified our con-

ceptions of the early history of the Aegean area are principally due to the discoveries of two men, Heinrich Schliemann and Sir Arthur Evans. Schliemann's labours began with the excavations on the site of Troy in the years 1870-1873; he passed on to the excavations at Mycenae in 1876, and to those at Tiryns in 1884. It was the discoveries of these years that revealed to us the Mycenaean age, and carried back the history to the middle of the 2nd millennium. The discoveries of Sir Arthur Evans in the island of Crete belong to a later period. The work of excavation was begun in 1900, and was carried on in subsequent years. It has revealed to us the Minoan age, and enabled us to trace back the development and origins of the civilization for a further period of 1000 or 1500 years. The dates assigned by archaeologists to the different periods of Mycenaean and Minoan art must be regarded as merely approximate. Even the relation of the two civilizations is still, to some extent, a matter of conjecture. The general chronological scheme, however, in the sense of the relative order of the various periods and the approximate intervals between them, is too firmly established, both by internal evidence, such as the development of the styles of pottery, and of the art in general, and by external evidence, such as the points of contact with Egyptian art and history, to admit of its being any longer seriously called in question.

THE MINOAN AND MYCENAEAN AGES.

If, then, by "Greek history" is to be understood the history of the lands occupied in later times by the Greek race (*i.e.* the Greek peninsula and the Aegean basin), the beginnings of the history must be carried back some 2000 years before Grote's proposed starting-point. If, however, "Greek history" is taken to mean the history of the Greek people, the determination of the starting-point is far from easy. For the question to which archaeology does not as yet supply any certain answer is the question of race. Were the creators of the Minoan and Mycenaean civilization Greeks, or were they not? In some degree the Minoan evidence has modified the answer suggested by the Mycenaean. Although wide differences of opinion as to the origin of the Mycenaean civilization existed among scholars when the results of Schliemann's labours were first given to the world, a general agreement had gradually been arrived at in favour of the view which would identify Mycenaean with Achaean or Homeric. In presence of the Cretan evidence it is no longer possible to maintain this view with the same confidence. The two chief difficulties in the way of attributing either the Minoan or the Mycenaean civilization to an Hellenic people are connected respectively with the script and the religion. The excavations at Cnossus have yielded thousands of tablets written in the linear script. There is evidence that this script was in use among the Mycenaeans as

well. If Greek was the language spoken at Cnossus and Mycenae, how is it that all attempts to decipher the script have hitherto failed? The Cretan excavations, again, have taught us a great deal as to the religion of the Minoan age; they have, at the same time, thrown a new light upon the evidence supplied by Mycenaean sites. It is no longer possible to ignore the contrast between the cults of the Minoan and Mycenaean ages, and the religious conceptions which they imply, and the cults and religious conceptions prevalent in the historical period. On the other hand, it may safely be asserted that the argument derived from the Mycenaean art, in which we seem to trace a freedom of treatment which is akin to the spirit of the later Greek art, and is in complete contrast to the spirit of Oriental art, has received striking confirmation from the remains of Minoan art. The decipherment of the script would at once solve the problem. We should at least know whether the dominant race in Crete in the Minoan age spoke an Hellenic or a non-Hellenic dialect. And what could be inferred with regard to Crete in the Minoan age could almost certainly be inferred with regard to the mainland in the Mycenaean age. In the meanwhile, possibly until the tablets are read, at any rate until further evidence is forth-coming, any answer that can be given to the question must necessarily be tentative and provisional.

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It has already been implied that this period of the history of Greece may be subdivided into a Minoan and a Mycenaean age. Whether these terms are appropriate is a question of comparatively little importance. They at least serve to remind us of the part played by the discoveries at Mycenae and Cnossus in the reconstruction of the history. The term "Mycenaean," it is true, has other associations than those of locality. It may seem to imply that the civilization disclosed in the excavations at Mycenae is Achaean in character, and that it is to be connected with the Pelopid dynasty to which Agamemnon belonged. In its scientific use, the term must be cleared of all such associations. Further, as opposed to "Minoan" it must be understood in a more definite sense than that in which it has often been employed. It has come to be generally recognized that two different periods are to be distinguished in Schliemann's discoveries at Mycenae itself. There is an earlier period, to which belong the objects found in the shaft-graves, and there is a later period, to which belong the beehive tombs and the remains of the palaces. It is the latter period which is "Mycenaean" in the strict sense; *i.e.* it is "Mycenaean" as opposed to "Minoan." To this period belong also the palace at Tiryns, the beehive-tombs discovered elsewhere on the mainland of Greece, and one of the cities on the site of Troy (Schliemann's sixth). The pottery of

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this period is as characteristic of it, both in its forms (*e.g.* the "stirrup" or "false-necked" form of vase) and in its peculiar glaze, as is the architecture of the palaces and the beehive-tombs. Although the chief remains have been found on the mainland of Greece itself, the art of this period is found to have extended as far north as Troy, and as far east as Cyprus. On the other hand, hardly any traces of it have been discovered on the west coast of Asia Minor, south of the Troad. The Mycenaean age, in this sense, may be regarded as extending from 1600 to 1200 B.C. The Minoan age is of far wider extent. Its latest period includes both the earlier and the later periods of the remains found at Mycenae. This is the period called by Sir Arthur Evans "Late Minoan." To this period belong the Great Palace at Cnossus and the linear system of writing. The "Middle Minoan" period, to which the earlier palace belongs, is characterised by the pictographic system of writing and by polychrome pottery of a peculiarly beautiful kind. Sir Arthur Evans proposes to carry back this period as far as 2500 B.C. Even behind it there are traces of a still earlier civilization. Thus the Minoan age, even if limited to the middle and later periods, will cover at least a thousand years. Perhaps the most surprising result of the excavations in Crete is the discovery that Minoan art is on a higher level than Mycenaean art. To the scholars of a generation ago it seemed a thing

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incredible that the art of the shaft-graves, and the architecture of the beehive tombs and the palaces, could belong to the age before the Dorian invasion. The most recent discoveries seem to indicate that the art of Mycenae is a decadent art; they certainly prove that an art, hardly inferior in its way to the art of the classical period, and a civilization which implies the command of great material resources, were flourishing in the Aegean perhaps a thousand years before the siege of Troy.

Oriental Influence.

To the question, "What is the origin of this civilization? Is it of foreign derivation or of native growth?" it is not possible to give a direct answer. It is clear, on the one hand, that it was developed, by a gradual process of differentiation, from a culture which was common to the whole Aegean basin and extended as far to the west as Sicily. It is equally clear, on the other hand, that foreign influences contributed largely to the process of development. Egyptian influences, in particular, can be traced throughout the "Minoan" and "Mycenaean" periods. The developed art, however, both in Crete and on the mainland, displays characteristics which are the very opposite of those which are commonly associated with the term "oriental." Egyptian work, even of the best period, is stiff and conventional; in

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the best Cretan work, and, in a less degree, in Mycenaean work, we find an originality and a freedom of treatment which remind one of the spirit of the Greek artists. The civilization is, in many respects, of an advanced type. The Cretan architects could design on a grand scale, and could carry out their designs with no small degree of mechanical skill. At Cnossus we find a system of drainage in use which is far in advance of anything known in the modern world before the 19th century. If the art of the Minoan age falls short of the art of the Periclean age, it is hardly inferior to that of the age of Peisistratus. It is a civilization, too, which has long been familiar with the art of writing. But it is one that belongs entirely to the Bronze Age. Iron is not found until the very end of the Mycenaean period, and then only in small quantities. Nor is this the only point of contrast between the culture of the earliest age and that of the historical period in Greece. The chief seats of the early culture are to be found either in the island of Crete or on the mainland, at Tiryns and Mycenae. In the later history Crete plays no part, and Tiryns and Mycenae are obscure. With the great names of a later age, Argos, Sparta and Athens, no great discoveries are connected. In northern Greece, Orchomenos rather than Thebes is the centre of influence. Further points of contrast readily suggest themselves. The so-called Phoenician alphabet, in

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use amongst the later Greeks, is unknown in the earliest age. Its systems of writing, both the earlier and the later one, are syllabic in character, and analogous to those in vogue in Asia Minor and Cyprus. In the art of war, the chariot is of more importance than the foot soldier, and the latter, unlike the Greek hoplite, is lightly clad and trusts to a shield large enough to cover the whole body, rather than to the metal helmet, breast-plate, and greaves of later times. The political system appears to have been a despotic monarchy, and the realm of the monarch to have extended to far wider limits than those of the "city-states" of historical Greece. It is, perhaps, in the religious practices of the age, and in the ideas implied in them, that the contrast is most apparent. Neither in Crete nor on the mainland is there any trace of the worship of the "Olympian" deities. The cults in vogue remind us rather of Asia than of Greece. The worship of pillars and of trees carries us back to Canaan, while the double-headed axe, so prominent in the ritual of Cnossus, survives in later times as the symbol of the national deity of the Carians. The beehive-tombs, found on many sites on the mainland besides Mycenae, are evidence both of a method of sepulture and of ideas of the future state which are alien to the practice and the thought of the Greeks of history. It is only in one region—in the island of Cyprus—that the culture of the Mycenaean age is

found surviving into the historical period. As late as the beginning of the 5th century B.C. Cyprus is still ruled by kings, the alphabet has not yet displaced a syllabary, the characteristic forms of Mycenaean vases still linger on, and the chief deity of the island is the goddess with attendant doves, whose images are among the common objects of Mycenaean finds.

III.

THE HOMERIC AGE.

Alike in Crete and on the mainland the civilization disclosed by excavation comes abruptly to an end. In Crete we can trace it back from *c.* 1200 B.C. to the Neolithic period. From the Stone Age to the end of the Minoan Age the development is continuous and uninterrupted.¹ But between the culture of the Early Age and the culture of the Dorians, who occupied the island in historical times, no connexion whatever can be established. Between the two there is a great gulf fixed. It would be difficult to imagine a greater contrast than that presented by the rude life of the Dorian communities in Crete when it is compared with the political power, the material resources, and the extensive commerce of the earlier period. The same gap between the archaeological age and the historical exists on the mainland also. It is true that the solution of continuity is here less complete. Mycenaean art continues, here and there, in a debased form down to the 9th century, a date to which we can

¹ It would be more accurate to say to the year 1500 B.C. At Cnossus the palace is sacked soon after this date, and the art, both in Crete and in the whole Aëgean area, becomes lifeless and decadent.

trace back the beginnings of the later Greek art. On one or two lines (*e.g.* architecture) it is even possible to establish some sort of connexion between them. But Greek art as a whole cannot be evolved from Mycenaean art. We cannot bridge over the interval that separates the latter art, even in its decline, from the former. It is sufficient to compare the "dipylon" ware (with which the process of development begins which culminates in the pottery of the Great Age) with the Mycenaean vases, to satisfy oneself that the gulf exists. What then is the relation of the Heroic or Homeric Age (*i.e.* the age whose life is portrayed for us in the poems of Homer) to the Earliest Age? It too presents many contrasts to the later periods. On the other hand, it presents contrasts to the Minoan Age, which, in their way, are not less striking. Is it then to be identified with the Mycenaean Age? Schliemann, the discoverer of the Mycenaean culture, unhesitatingly identified Mycenaean with Homeric. He even identified the shaft-graves of Mycenae with the tombs of Agamemnon and Clytemnestra. Later inquirers, while refusing to discover so literal a correspondence between things Homeric and things Mycenaean, have not hesitated to accept a general correspondence between the Homeric Age and the Mycenaean. Where it is a case of comparing literary evidence with archaeological, an exact coincidence is not, of course, to be demanded. The most that

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can be asked is that a general correspondence should be established. It may be conceded that the case for such a correspondence appears *prima facie* a strong one. There is much in Homer that seems to find confirmation or explanation in Schliemann's finds. Mycenae is Agamemnon's city; the plan of the Homeric house agrees fairly well with the palaces at Tiryns and Mycenae; the forms and the technique of Mycenaean art serve to illustrate passages in the poems—such are only a few of the arguments that have been urged. It is the great merit of Professor Ridgeway's work (*The Early Age of Greece*) that it has demonstrated, once and for all, that Mycenaean is not Homeric pure and simple. He insists upon differences as great as the resemblances. Iron is in common use in Homer; it is practically unknown to the Mycenaeans. In place of the round shield and the metal armour of the Homeric soldier, we find at Mycenae that the warrior is lightly clad in linen, and that he fights behind an oblong shield, which covers the whole body; nor are the chariots the same in form. The Homeric dead are cremated; the Mycenaean are buried. The gods of Homer are the deities of Olympus, of whose cult no traces are to be found in the Mycenaean Age. The novelty of Professor Ridgeway's theory is that for the accepted equation, Homeric=Achaean=Mycenaean, he proposes to substitute the equations, Homeric=Achaean

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= post-Mycenaean, and Mycenaean = pre-Achaean = Pelasgian. The Mycenaean civilization he attributes to the Pelasgians, whom he regards as the indigenous population of Greece, the ancestors of the later Greeks, and themselves Greek both in speech and blood. The Homeric heroes are Achaeans, a fair-haired Celtic race, whose home was in the Danube valley, where they had learned the use of iron. In Greece they are newcomers, a conquering class comparable to the Norman invaders of England or Ireland, and, like them, they have acquired the language of their subjects in the course of a few generations. The Homeric civilization is thus Achaean, *i.e.* it is Pelasgian (Mycenaean) civilization, appropriated by a ruder race; but the Homeric culture is far inferior to the Mycenaean. Here, at any rate, the Norman analogy breaks down. Norman art in England is far in advance of Saxon. Even in Normandy (as in Sicily), where the Norman appropriated rather than introduced, he not only assimilated but developed. In Greece the process must have been reversed.

The theory thus outlined is probably stronger on its destructive side than on its constructive. To treat the Achaeans as an immigrant race is to run counter to the tradition of the Greeks themselves, by whom the Achaeans were regarded as indigenous (cf. Herod. viii. 73). Nor is the Pelasgian part of the theory easy to reconcile with the Homeric evidence. If the

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Achaeans were a conquering class ruling over a Pelasgian population, we should expect to find this difference of race a prominent feature in Homeric society. We should, at least, expect to find a Pelasgian background to the Homeric picture. As a matter of fact, we find nothing of the sort. There is no consciousness in the Homeric poems of a distinction of race between the governing and the subject classes. There are, indeed, Pelasgians in Homer, but the references either to the people or the name are extraordinarily few. They appear as a people, presumably in Asia Minor, in alliance with the Trojans ; they appear also, in a single passage, as one of the tribes inhabiting Crete. The name survives in "Pelasgicon Argos," which is probably to be identified with the valley of the Spercheius,¹ and as an epithet of Zeus of Dodona. The population, however, of Pelasgicon Argos and of Dodona is no longer Pelasgian. Thus, in the age of Homer, the Pelasgians belong, so far as Greece proper is concerned, to a past that is already remote. It is inadmissible to appeal to Herodotus against Homer. For the conditions of the Homeric age Homer is the sole authoritative witness. If, however, Professor Ridgeway has failed to prove that "Mycenaean" equals "Pelasgian," he has certainly proved that much that is Homeric is post-

¹ See T. W. Allen in the *Classical Review*, vol. xx. (1906), No. 4 (May).

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Mycenaean. It is possible that different strata are to be distinguished in the Homeric poems. There are passages which seem to assume the conditions of the Mycenaean age; there are others which presuppose the conditions of a later age. It may be that the latter passages reflect the circumstances of the poet's own times, while the former ones reproduce those of an earlier period. If so, the substitution of iron for bronze must have been effected in the interval between the earlier and the later periods.

The Homeric State.

It has already been pointed out that the question whether the makers of the Minoan and Mycenaean civilizations were Greeks must still be regarded as an open one. No such question can be raised as to the Homeric Age. The Achaeans may or may not have been Greek in blood. What is certain is that the Achaean Age forms an integral part of Greek history. Alike on the linguistic, the religious, and the political sides, Homer is the starting-point of subsequent developments. In the Greek dialects the great distinction is that between the Doric and the rest. Of the non-Doric dialects the two main groups are the Aeolic and Ionic, both of which have been developed, by a gradual process of differentiation, from the language of the Homeric poems. With regard to religion it is sufficient to refer to the judgment of

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Herodotus, that it was Homer and Hesiod who were the authors of the Greek theogony (ii. 53 : οὗτοί εἰσι οἱ ποιήσαντες θεογονίην Ἑλλησι.) It is a commonplace that Homer was the Bible of the Greeks. On the political side, Greek constitutional development would be unintelligible without Homer. When Greek history, in the proper sense, begins, oligarchy is almost universal. Everywhere, however, an antecedent stage of monarchy has to be presupposed. In the Homeric system monarchy is the sole form of government ; but it is monarchy already well on the way to being transformed into oligarchy. In the person of the king are united the functions of priest, of judge, and of leader in war. He belongs to a family which claims divine descent and his office is hereditary. He is, however, no despotic monarch. He is compelled by custom to consult the council (*boulē*) of the elders, or chiefs. He must ask their opinion, and, if he fails to obtain their consent, he has no power to enforce his will. Even when he has obtained the consent of the council, the proposal still awaits the approval of the assembly (*agora*) of the people.

Homeric Society.

Thus in the Homeric state we find the germs not only of the oligarchy and democracy of later Greece, but also of all the various forms of constitution known to the Western world. And a monarchy such as is

depicted in the Homeric poems is clearly ripe for transmutation into oligarchy. The chiefs are addressed as kings (*βασιλῆες*), and claim, equally with the monarch, descent from the gods. In Homer, again, we can trace the later organization into tribe (*φυλή*), clan (*γένος*), and phratry, which is characteristic of Greek society in the historical period, and meets us in analogous forms in other Aryan societies. The *γένος* corresponds to the Roman *gens*, the *φυλή* to the Roman tribe, and the phratry to the *curia*. The importance of the *phratry* in Homeric society is illustrated by the well-known passage (*Iliad* ix. 63) in which the outcast is described as "one who belongs to no phratry" (*φάρητωρ*). It is a society that is, of course, based upon slavery, but it is slavery in its least repulsive aspect. The treatment which Eumæus and Eurycleia receive at the hands of the poet of the *Odyssey* is highly creditable to the humanity of the age. A society which regarded the slave as a mere chattel would have been impatient of the interest shown in a swineherd and a nurse. It is a society, too, that exhibits many of the distinguishing traits of later Greek life. Feasting and quarrels, it is true, are of more moment to the heroes than to the contemporaries of Pericles or Plato; but "music" and "gymnastic" (though the terms must be understood in a more restricted sense) are as distinctive of the age of Homer as of that of Pindar. In one respect there

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is retrogression in the historical period. Woman in Homeric society enjoys a greater freedom, and receives greater respect, than in the Athens of Sophocles and Pericles.

IV.

THE GROWTH OF THE GREEK STATES.

The Greek world at the beginning of the 6th century B.C. presents a picture in many respects different from that of the Homeric Age. The Greek race is no longer confined to the Greek peninsula. It occupies the islands of the Aegean, the western seaboard of Asia Minor, the coasts of Macedonia and Thrace, of southern Italy and Sicily. Scattered settlements are found as far apart as the mouth of the Rhone, the north of Africa, the Crimea, and the eastern end of the Black Sea. The Greeks are called by a national name, *Hellenes*, the symbol of a fully-developed national self-consciousness. They are divided into three great branches, the Dorian, the Ionian, and the Aeolian, names almost, or entirely, unknown to Homer. The heroic monarchy has nearly everywhere disappeared. In Greece proper, south of Thermopylae, it survives, but in a peculiar form, in the Spartan state alone. What is the significance and the explanation of contrasts so profound?

The Dorian Invasion.

It is probable that the explanation is to be found, directly or indirectly, in a single cause, the Dorian

invasion. In Homer the Dorians are mentioned in one passage only (*Odyssey* xix. 177). They there appear as one of the races which inhabit Crete. In the historical period the whole Peloponnese, with the exception of Arcadia, Elis, and Achaea, is Dorian. In northern Greece the Dorians occupy the little state of Doris, and in the Aegean they form the population of Crete, Rhodes, and some smaller islands. Thus the chief centres of Minoan and Mycenaean culture have passed into Dorian hands, and the chief seats of Achaean power are included in Dorian states. Greek tradition explained the overthrow of the Achaean system by an invasion of the Peloponnese by the Dorians, a northern tribe, which had found a temporary home in Doris. The story ran that, after an unsuccessful attempt to force an entrance by the Isthmus of Corinth, they had crossed from Naupactus, at the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf, landed on the opposite shore, and made their way into the heart of the Peloponnese, where a single victory gave them possession of the Achaean states. Their conquests were divided among the invaders into three shares, for which lots were cast, and thus the three states of Argos, Sparta, and Messenia were created. There is much in this tradition that is impossible or improbable. It is impossible, *e.g.* for the tiny state of Doris, with its three or four "small, sad villages" (πόλεις μικραὶ καὶ λυπρόχωροι: Strabo, p. 427), to have furnished a

force of invaders sufficient to conquer and re-people the greater part of the Peloponnese. It is improbable that the conquest should have been either as sudden, or as complete, as the legend represents. On the contrary, there are indications that the conquest was gradual, and that the displacement of the older population was incomplete. The improbability of the details affords, however, no ground for questioning the reality of the invasion.¹ The tradition can be traced back at Sparta to the 7th century B.C. (Tyrtaeus, quoted by Strabo, p. 362), and there is abundant evidence, other than that of legend, to corroborate it. There is the Dorian name, to begin with. If, as Beloch supposes, it originated on the coast of Asia Minor, where it served to distinguish the settlers in Rhodes and the neighbouring islands from the Ionians and Aeolians to the north of them, how came the great and famous states of the Peloponnese to adopt a name in use among the petty colonies planted by their kinsmen across the sea? Or, if Dorian is simply Old Peloponnesian, how are we to account for the Doric dialect or the Dorian pride of race?

It is true that there are great differences between the literary Doric, the dialect of Corinth and Argos, and the dialects of Laconia and Crete, and that there

¹ It has been impugned by J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*, i. 149 ff. (1st ed.).

are affinities between the dialect of Laconia and the non-Dorian dialects of Arcadia and Elis. It is equally true, however, and of far more consequence, that all the Doric dialects are distinguished from all other Greek dialects by certain common characteristics. Perhaps the strongest sentiment in the Dorian nature is the pride of race. Indeed, it looks as if the Dorians claimed to be the sole genuine Hellenes. How can we account for an indigenous population, first imagining itself to be immigrant, and then developing a contempt for the rest of the race, equally indigenous with itself, on account of a fictitious difference in origin? Finally, there is the archaeological evidence. The older civilization comes to an abrupt end, and it does so, on the mainland at least, at the very period to which tradition assigns the Dorian migration. Its development is greatest, and its overthrow most complete, precisely in the regions occupied by the Dorians and the other tribes, whose migrations were traditionally connected with theirs. It is hardly too much to say that the archaeologist would have been compelled to postulate an inroad into central and southern Greece of tribes from the north, at a lower level of culture, in the course of the 12th and 11th centuries B.C., if the historian had not been able to direct him to the traditions of the great migrations (*μεταναστάσεις*), of which the Dorian invasion was the chief.

With the Dorian migration Greek tradition connected the expansion of the Greek race eastwards across the Aegean. In the historical period the Greek settlements on the western coast of Asia Minor fall into three clearly-defined groups. To the north is the Aeolic group, consisting of the island of Lesbos and twelve towns, mostly insignificant, on the opposite mainland. To the south is the Dorian *Hexapolis*, consisting of Cnidus and Halicarnassus on the mainland and the islands of Rhodes and Cos. In the centre comes the Ionian *Dodecapolis*, a group consisting of ten towns on the mainland, together with the islands of Samos and Chios. Of these three groups, the Ionian is incomparably the most important. The Ionians also occupy Euboea and the Cyclades. Although it would appear that Cyprus (and possibly Pamphylia) had been occupied by settlers from Greece in the Mycenaean age, Greek tradition is probably correct in putting the colonization of Asia Minor and the islands of the Aegean after the Dorian migration. Both the Homeric and the archaeological evidence seem to point to the same conclusion. Between Rhodes on the south and the Troad on the north scarcely any Mycenaean remains have been found. Homer is ignorant of any Greeks east of Euboea. If the poems are earlier than the Dorian Invasion, his silence is conclusive. If the poems are some centuries later than the Invasion, they at least prove that,

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within a few generations of that event, it was the belief of the Greeks of Asia Minor that their ancestors had crossed the seas after the close of the Heroic Age. It is probable, too, that the names Ionian and Aeolian, the former of which is found once in Homer, and the latter not at all, originated among the colonists in Asia Minor, and served to designate, in the first instance, the members of the Ionic and of the Aeolic *Dodecapolis*. As Curtius¹ pointed out, the only Ionia known to history is in Asia Minor. It does not follow that Ionia is the original home of the Ionian race, as Curtius argued. It almost certainly follows, however, that it is the original home of the Ionian name.

It is less easy to account for the name *Hellenes*. The Greeks were profoundly conscious of their common nationality, and of the gulf that separated them from the rest of mankind. They themselves recognized a common race and language, and a common type of religion and culture, as the chief factors in this sentiment of nationality (see Herod. viii. 144: τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἐὸν ὁμαιμόν τε καὶ ὁμόγλωσσον καὶ θεῶν ἰδρύματά τε κοινὰ καὶ θυσίαι ἡθεά τε ὁμότροπα). “Hellenes” was the name of their common race, and “Hellas” of their common country. In Homer there is no distinct consciousness of a common nationality, and consequently no anti-thesis of Greek and Barbarian (see Thuc. i. 3). Nor

¹ *History of Greece* (Eng. trans., i. 32 ff.); cf. the same writer's *Ioner vor der ionischen Wanderung*.

is there a true collective name. There are indeed Hellenes (though the name occurs in one passage only, *Iliad* ii. 684), and there is a Hellas ; but his Hellas, whatever its precise signification may be, is, at any rate, not equivalent either to Greece proper or to the land of the Greeks, and his Hellenes are the inhabitants of a small district to the south of Thessaly. It is possible that the diffusion of the Hellenic name was due to the Dorian invaders. Its use can be traced back to the first half of the 7th century.

Government.

Not less obscure are the causes of the fall of monarchy. It cannot have been the immediate effect of the Dorian conquest, for the states founded by the Dorians were at first monarchically governed. It may, however, have been an indirect effect of it. We have already seen that the power of the Homeric king is more limited than that of the rulers of Cnossus, Tiryns, or Mycenæ. In other words, monarchy is already in decay at the epoch of the Invasion. The Invasion, in its effects on wealth, commerce, and civilization, is almost comparable to the irruption of the barbarians into the Roman empire. The monarch of the Minoan and Mycenaean age has extensive revenues at his command ; the monarch of the early Dorian states is little better than a petty chief. Thus the interval, once a wide one, that

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separates him from the nobles tends to disappear. The decay of monarchy was gradual ; much more gradual than is generally recognized. There were parts of the Greek world in which it still survived in the 6th century, *e.g.* Sparta, Cyrene, Cyprus, and possibly Argos and Tarentum. Both Herodotus and Thucydides apply the title " king " (βασιλεύς) to the rulers of Thessaly in the 5th century. The date at which monarchy gave place to a republican form of government must have differed, and differed widely, in different cases. The traditions relating to the foundation of Cyrene assume the existence of monarchy in Thera and in Crete in the middle of the 7th century (Herodotus iv. 150 and 154), and the reign of Amphicrates at Samos (Herod. iii. 59) can hardly be placed less than a generation earlier. In view of our general ignorance of the history of the 7th and 8th centuries, it is hazardous to pronounce these instances exceptional. On the other hand, the change from monarchy to oligarchy was completed at Athens before the end of the 8th century, and at a still earlier date in some of the other states. The process, again, by which the change was effected was, in all probability, less uniform than is generally assumed. There are extremely few cases in which we have any trustworthy evidence, and the instances about which we are informed refuse to be reduced to any common type. In Greece proper our information

is fullest in the case of Athens and Argos. In the former case, the king is gradually stripped of his powers by a process of devolution. For an hereditary king, ruling for life, there are substituted three annual and elective magistrates, between whom are divided the executive, military, and religious functions of the monarch. At Argos the fall of the monarchy is preceded by an aggrandisement of the royal prerogatives. There is nothing in common between these two cases, and there is no reason to suppose that the process elsewhere was analogous to that at Athens. Everywhere, however, oligarchy is the form of government which succeeds to monarchy. Political power is monopolized by a class of nobles, whose claim to govern is based upon birth and the possession of land, the most valuable form of property in an early society. Sometimes power is confined to a single clan (*e.g.* the Bacchiadae at Corinth); more commonly, as at Athens, all houses that are noble are equally privileged. In every case there is found, as the adviser of the executive, a Boulē, or council, representative of the privileged class. Without such a council a Greek oligarchy is inconceivable. The relations of the executive to the council doubtless varied. At Athens it is clear that the real authority was exercised by the archons; ¹ in many

¹ If the account of early Athenian constitutional history given in the *Athenaion Politeia* were accepted, it would follow that the archons were inferior in authority to the Eupatrid Boulē, the Arcopagus.

states the magistrates were probably subordinate to the council (cf. the relation of the consuls to the senate at Rome). And it is clear that the way in which the oligarchies used their power varied also. The cases in which the power was abused are naturally the ones of which we hear ; for an abuse of power gave rise to discontent and was the ultimate cause of revolution. We hear little or nothing of the cases in which power was exercised wisely. Happy is the constitution which has no annals ! We know, however, that oligarchy held its ground for generations, or even for centuries, in a large proportion of the Greek states ; and a government which, like the oligarchies of Elis, Thebes, or Aegina, could maintain itself for three or four centuries cannot have been merely oppressive.

Trade.

The period of the transition from monarchy to oligarchy is the period in which commerce begins to develop, and trade-routes to be organized. Greece had been the centre of an active trade in the Minoan and Mycenaean epochs. The products of Crete and of the Peloponnese had found their way to Egypt and Asia Minor. The overthrow of the older civilization put an end to commerce. The seas became insecure, and intercourse with the East was interrupted. Our earliest glimpses of the Aegean after the period of the

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migrations disclose the raids of the pirate and the activity of the Phoenician trader. It is not till the 8th century has dawned that trade begins to revive, and the Phoenician has to retire before his Greek competitor. For some time to come, however, no clear distinction is drawn between the trader and the pirate. The pioneers of Greek trade in the West are the pirates of Cumae (Thucyd. vi. 4). The expansion of Greek commerce, unlike that of the commerce of the modern world, was not connected with any great scientific discoveries. There is nothing in the history of ancient navigation that is analogous to the invention of the mariner's compass or the steam-engine. In spite of this, the development of Greek commerce in the 7th and 6th centuries was rapid. It must have been assisted by the great discovery of the early part of the former century, the invention of coined money. To the Lydians, rather than the Greeks, belongs the credit of the discovery ; but it was the genius of the latter race that divined the importance of the invention and spread its use. The coinage of the Ionian towns goes back to the reign of Gyges (c. 675 B.C.). And it is in Ionia that commercial development is earliest and greatest. In the most distant regions the Ionian is first in the field. Egypt and the Black Sea are both opened up to Greek trade by Miletus, the Adriatic and the Western Mediterranean by Phocaea and Samos. It is significant that of the twelve states engaged in

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the Egyptian trade in the 6th century all, with the exception of Aegina, are from the eastern side of the Aegean (Herod. ii. 178). On the western side the chief centres of trade during these centuries were the islands of Euboea and Aegina and the town of Corinth. The Aeginetan are the earliest coins of Greece proper (c. 650 B.C.) ; and the two rival scales of weights and measures, in use amongst the Greeks of every age, are the Aeginetan and the Euboic. Commerce naturally gave rise to commercial leagues, and commercial relations tended to bring about political alliances. Foreign policy even at this early epoch seems to have been largely determined by considerations of commerce. Two leagues, the members of which were connected by political as well as commercial ties, can be recognized. At the head of each stood one of the two rival powers in the island of Euboea, Chalcis and Eretria. Their primary object was doubtless protection from the pirate and the foreigner. Competing routes were organized at an early date under their influence, and their trading connexions can be traced from the heart of Asia Minor to the north of Italy. Miletus, Sybaris, and Etruria were members of the Eretrian league ; Samos, Corinth, Rhegium and Zancle (commanding the Straits of Messina), and Cumae, on the Bay of Naples, of the Chalcidian. The wool of the Phrygian uplands, woven in the looms of Miletus, reached the Etruscan markets by way of

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Sybaris; through Cumae, Rome and the rest of Latium obtained the elements of Greek culture. Greek trade, however, was confined to the Mediterranean area. The Phoenician and the Carthaginian navigators penetrated to Britain; they discovered the passage round the Cape two thousand years before Vasco da Gama's time. The Greek sailor dared not adventure himself outside the Black Sea, the Adriatic, and the Mediterranean. Greek trade, too, was essentially maritime. Ports visited by Greek vessels were often the starting points of trade-routes into the interior; the traffic along those routes was left in the hands of the natives (see *e.g.* Herod. iv. 24). One service, the importance of which can hardly be over-estimated, was rendered to civilization by the Greek traders—the invention of geography. The science of geography is the invention of the Greeks. The first maps were made by them (in the 6th century); and it was the discoveries and surveys of their sailors that made map-making possible.

Colonization.

Closely connected with the history of Greek trade is the history of Greek colonization. The period of colonization, in its narrower sense, extends from the middle of the 8th to the middle of the 6th century. Greek colonization is, however, merely a continuation of the process which at an earlier epoch had led to the

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settlement, first of Cyprus, and then of the islands and coasts of the Aegean. From the earlier settlements the colonization of the historical period is distinguished by three characteristics. The later colony acknowledges a definite *metropolis* ("mother-city"); it is planted by a definite *oecist* (οἰκιστής); it has a definite date assigned to its foundation.¹ It would be a mistake to regard Greek colonization as commercial in origin, in the sense that the colonies were in all cases established as trading-posts. This was the case with the Phoenician and Carthaginian settlements, most of which remained mere factories; and some of the Greek colonies (e.g. many of those planted by Miletus on the shores of the Black Sea) bore this character. The typical Greek colony, however, was neither in origin nor in development a mere trading-post. It was, or it became, a *polis*, a city-state, in which was reproduced the life of the parent state. Nor was Greek colonization, like the emigration from Europe to America and Australia in the 19th century, simply the result of over-population. The causes were as various as those which can be traced in the history of modern colonization. Those which were established for the purposes of trade may be compared to the factories of the Portuguese and Dutch in Africa

¹ The dates before the middle of the 7th century are in most cases artificial, e.g., those given by Thucydides (book vi.) for the earlier Sicilian settlements. See J. P. Mahaffy, *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, ii. 164 ff.

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and the Far East. Others were the result of political discontent, in some form or shape; these may be compared to the Puritan settlements in New England. Others again were due to ambition or the mere love of adventure (see Herod. v. 42 ff., the career of Dorieus). But however various the causes, two conditions must always be pre-supposed—an expansion of commerce and a growth of population. Within the narrow limits of the city-state there was a constant tendency for population to become redundant, until, as in the later centuries of Greek life, its growth was artificially restricted.

Alike from the Roman colonies, and from those founded by the European nations in the course of the last few centuries, the Greek colonies are distinguished by a fundamental contrast. It is significant that the contrast is a political one. The Roman colony was in a position of entire subordination to the Roman state, of which it formed a part. The modern colony was, in varying degrees, in political subjection to the home government. The Greek colony was completely independent; and it was independent from the first. The ties that united a colony to its metropolis were those of sentiment and interest; the political tie did not exist. There were, it is true, exceptions. The colonies established by imperial Athens closely resembled the colonies of imperial Rome. The cleruchy formed part of the

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Athenian state ; the cleruchs kept their status as citizens of Athens and acted as a military garrison. And if the political tie, in the proper sense, was wanting, it was inevitable that political relations should spring out of commercial or sentimental ones. Thus we find Corinth interfering twice to save her colony Syracuse from destruction, and Megara bringing about the revolt of Byzantium, her colony, from Athens. Sometimes it is not easy to distinguish political relations from a political tie (*e.g.* the relations of Corinth, both in the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars, to Ambracia and the neighbouring group of colonies.)

When we compare the development of the Greek and the modern colonies we shall find that the development of the former was even more rapid than that of the latter. In at least three respects the Greek settler was at an advantage as compared with the colonist of modern times. The differences of race, of colour, and of climate, with which the chief problems of modern colonization are connected, played no part in the history of the Greek settlements. The races amongst whom the Greeks planted themselves were in some cases on a similar level of culture. Where the natives were still backward or barbarous, they came of a stock either closely related to the Greek, or at least separated from it by no great physical differences. We need only contrast the Carian, the

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Sicel, the Thracian, or even the Scythian, with the native Australian, the Hottentot, the Red Indian, or the Maori, to apprehend the advantage of the Greek. Amalgamation with the native races was easy, and it involved neither physical nor intellectual degeneracy as its consequence. Of the races with which the Greeks came in contact the Thracian was far from the highest in the scale of culture; yet three of the greatest names in the Great Age of Athens are those of men who had Thracian blood in their veins, viz., Themistocles, Cimon and the historian Thucydides. In the absence of any distinction of colour, no insuperable barrier existed between the Greek and the hellenized native. The *demos* of the colonial cities was largely recruited from the native population,¹ nor was there anything in the Greek world analogous to the "mean whites" or the "black belt." Of hardly less importance were the climatic conditions. In this respect the Mediterranean area is unique. There is no other region of the world of equal extent in which these conditions are at once so uniform and so favourable. Nowhere had the Greek settler to encounter a climate which was either unsuited to his labour or subversive of his vigour. That in spite of these advantages so little, comparatively speaking, was effected in the work of Hellenization before the epoch

¹ At Syracuse the *demos* makes common cause with the Sicel serf-population against the nobles (Herod vii. 155).

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of Alexander and the Diadochi was the effect of a single counteracting cause. The Greek colonist, like the Greek trader, clung to the shore. He penetrated no farther inland than the sea-breeze. Hence it was only in islands, such as Sicily or Cyprus, that the process of Hellenization was complete. Elsewhere the Greek settlements formed a mere fringe along the coast.

The Tyrants.

To the 7th century there belongs another movement of high importance in its bearing upon the economic, religious, and literary development of Greece, as well as upon its constitutional history. This movement is the rise of the *tyrannis*. In the political writers of a later age the word possesses a clear-cut connotation. From other forms of monarchy it is distinguished by a twofold differentiation. The *tyrannus* is an unconstitutional ruler, and his authority is exercised over unwilling subjects. In the 7th and 6th centuries the line was not drawn so distinctly between the tyrant and the legitimate monarch. Even Herodotus uses the words "tyrant" and "king" interchangeably (*e.g.* the princes of Cyprus are called "kings" in v. 110 and "tyrants" in v. 109), so that it is sometimes difficult to decide whether a legitimate monarch or a tyrant is meant (*e.g.* Aristophilides of Tarentum, iii. 136, or Telys of Sybaris,

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v. 44). But the distinction between the tyrant and the king of the Heroic Age is a valid one. It is not true that his rule was always exercised over unwilling subjects ; it is true that his position was always unconstitutional. The Homeric king is a legitimate monarch ; his authority is invested with the sanctions of religion and immemorial custom. The tyrant is an illegitimate ruler ; his authority is not recognized, either by customary usage or by express enactment. But the word " tyrant " was originally a neutral term ; it did not necessarily imply a misuse of power. The origin of the *tyrannis* is obscure. The word *tyrannus* has been thought, with some reason, to be a Lydian one. Probably both the name and the thing originated in the Greek colonies of Asia Minor, though the earliest tyrants of whom we hear in Asia Minor (at Ephesus and Miletus) are a generation later than the earliest in Greece itself, where, both at Sicyon and at Corinth, tyranny appears to date back to the second quarter of the 7th century.

It is not unusual to regard tyranny as a universal stage in the constitutional development of the Greek states, and as a stage that occurs everywhere at one and the same period. In reality, tyranny is confined to certain regions, and it is a phenomenon that is peculiar to no one age or century. In Greece proper, before the 4th century B.C., it is confined to a small group of states round the Corinthian and

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Saronic Gulfs. The greater part of the Peloponnese was exempt from it, and there is no good evidence for its existence north of the Isthmus, except at Megara and Athens. It plays no part in the history of the Greek cities in Chalcidice and Thrace. It appears to have been rare in the Cyclades. The regions in which it finds a congenial soil are two, Asia Minor and Sicily. Thus it is incorrect to say that most Greek states passed through this stage. It is still wider of the mark to assume that they passed through it at the same time. There is no "Age of the Tyrants." Tyranny began in the Peloponnese a hundred years before it appears in Sicily, and it has disappeared in the Peloponnese almost before it begins in Sicily. In the latter the great age of tyranny comes at the beginning of the 5th century ; in the former it is at the end of the 7th and the beginning of the 6th. At Athens the history of tyranny begins after it has ended both at Sicyon and Corinth. There is, indeed, a period in which tyranny is non-existent in the Greek states ; roughly speaking, the last sixty years of the 5th century. But with this exception, there is no period in which the tyrant is not to be found. The greatest of all the tyrannies, that of Dionysius at Syracuse, belongs to the 4th century. Nor must it be assumed that tyranny always comes at the same stage in the history of a constitution ; that it is always a stage between oligarchy and democracy. At Corinth

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it is followed, not by democracy, but by oligarchy, and it is an oligarchy that lasts, with a brief interruption, two hundred and fifty years. At Athens it is not immediately preceded by oligarchy. Between the Eupatrid oligarchy and the rule of Peisistratus there comes the timocracy of Solon. These exceptions do not stand alone. The cause of tyranny is, in one sense, uniform. In the earlier centuries, at any rate, tyranny is always the expression of discontent ; the tyrant is always the champion of a cause. But it would be a mistake to suppose that the discontent is necessarily political, or that the cause which he champions is always a constitutional one. At Sicyon it is racial ; Cleisthenes is the champion of the older population against their Dorian oppressors (see Herod. v. 67, 68). At Athens the discontent is economic rather than political ; Peisistratus is the champion of the Diacrii, the inhabitants of the poorest region of Attica. The party-strifes of which we hear in the early history of Miletus, which doubtless gave the tyrant his opportunity, are concerned with the claims of rival industrial classes. In Sicily the tyrant is the ally of the rich and the foe of the *demos*, and the cause which he champions, both in the 5th century and the 4th, is a national one, that of the Greek against the Carthaginian. We may suspect that in Greece itself the tyrannies of the 7th century are the expression of an anti-Dorian reaction. It can hardly be an

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accident that the states in which the *tyrannis* is found at this epoch, Corinth, Megara, Sicyon, Epidaurus, are all of them states in which a Dorian upper class ruled over a subject population. In Asia Minor the *tyrannis* assumes a peculiar character after the Persian conquest. The tyrant rules as the deputy of the Persian satrap. Thus in the East the tyrant is the enemy of the national cause ; in the West, in Sicily, he is its champion.

Tyranny is not a phenomenon peculiar to Greek history. It is possible to find analogies to it in Roman history, in the power of Caesar, or of the Caesars ; in the despotisms of medieval Italy ; or even in the Napoleonic empire. Between the tyrant and the Italian despot there is indeed a real analogy ; but between the Roman principate and the Greek *tyrannis* there are two essential differences. In the first place, the principate was expressed in constitutional forms, or veiled under constitutional fictions ; the tyrant stood altogether outside the constitution. And, secondly, at Rome both Julius and Augustus owed their position to the power of the sword. The power of the sword, it is true, plays a large part in the history of the later tyrants (*e.g.* Dionysius of Syracuse) ; the earlier ones, however, had no mercenary armies at their command. We can hardly compare the body-guard of Peisistratus to the legions of the first or the second Caesar.

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The view taken of the *tyrannis* in Greek literature is almost uniformly unfavourable. In this respect there is no difference between Plato and Aristotle, or between Herodotus and the later historians.¹ His policy is represented as purely selfish, and his rule as oppressive. Herodotus is influenced partly by the traditions current among the oligarchs, who had been the chief sufferers, and partly by the odious associations which had gathered round tyranny in Asia Minor. The philosophers write under their impressions of the later *tyrannis*, and their account is largely an *a priori* one. It is seldom that we find any attempt, either in the philosophers or the historians, to do justice to the real services rendered by the tyrants.² Their first service was a constitutional one. They helped to break down the power of the old aristocratic houses, and thus to create the social and political conditions indispensable to democracy. The *tyrannis* involved the sacrifice of liberty in the cause of equality. When tyranny falls, it is never succeeded by the aristocracies which it has overthrown. It is frequently succeeded by an oligarchy, but it is an oligarchy in which the claim to exclusive power is based, not upon mere birth, but upon wealth, or the possession of land. It would be unfair to treat

¹ An exception should perhaps be made in the case of Thucydides.

² The Peisistratidae come off better, however.

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this service as one that was rendered unconsciously and unwillingly. Where the tyrant asserted the claims of an oppressed class, he consciously aimed at the destruction of privilege and the effacement of class distinctions. Hence it is unjust to treat his power as resting upon mere force. A government which can last eighty or a hundred years, as was the case with the tyrannies at Corinth and Sicyon, must have a moral force behind it. It must rest upon the consent of its subjects. The second service which the tyrants rendered to Greece was a political one. Their policy tended to break down the barriers which isolated each petty state from its neighbours. In their history we can trace a system of 'widespread alliances, which are often cemented by matrimonial connexions. The Cypselid tyrants of Corinth appear to have been allied with the royal families of Egypt, Lydia, and Phrygia, as well as with the tyrants of Miletus and Epidaurus, and with some of the great Athenian families. In Sicily we find a league of the northern tyrants opposed to a league of the southern ; and in each case there is a corresponding matrimonial alliance. Anaxilaus of Rhegium is the son-in-law and ally of Terillus of Himera ; Gelo of Syracuse stands in the same relation to Theron of Agrigentum. Royal marriages have played a great part in the politics of Europe. In the comparison of Greek and modern history it has been too often forgotten how great a

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difference it makes, and how great a disadvantage it involves, to a republic that it has neither sons nor daughters to give in marriage. In commerce and colonization the tyrants were only continuing the work of the oligarchies to which they succeeded. Greek trade owed its expansion to the intelligent efforts of the oligarchs who ruled at Miletus and Corinth, in Samos, Aegina, and Euboea ; but in particular cases such as Miletus, Corinth, Sicyon, and Athens, there was a further development, and a still more rapid growth, under the tyrants. In the same way, the foundation of the colonies was in most cases due to the policy of the oligarchical governments. They can claim credit for the colonies of Chalcis and Eretria, of Megara, Phocaea, and Samos, as well as for the great Achæan settlements in southern Italy. The Cypselids at Corinth, and Thrasybulus at Miletus, are instances of tyrants who colonized on a great scale.

Religion under the Tyrants.

In their religious policy the tyrants went far to democratize Greek religion. The functions of monarchy had been largely religious ; but, while the king was necessarily a priest, he was not the only priest in the community. There were special priesthoods, hereditary in particular families, even in the monarchical period ; and upon the fall of the monarchy, while the priestly functions of the kings

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passed to republican magistrates, the priesthoods which were in the exclusive possession of the great families tended to become the important ones. Thus, before the rise of tyranny, Greek religion is aristocratic. The cults recognized by the state are the *sacra* of noble clans. The religious prerogatives of the nobles helped to confirm their political ones, and, as long as religion retained its aristocratic character, it was impossible for democracy to take root. The policy of the tyrants aimed at fostering popular cults which had no associations with the old families, and at establishing new festivals. The cult of the wine-god, Dionysus, was thus fostered at Sicyon by Cleisthenes, and at Corinth by the Cypselids ; while at Athens a new festival of this deity, which so completely overshadowed the older festival that it became known as the Great Dionysia, probably owed its institution to Peisistratus. Another festival, the Panathenaea, which had been instituted only a few years before his rise to power, became under his rule, and thanks to his policy, the chief national festival of the Athenian state. Everywhere, again, we find the tyrants the patrons of literature. Pindar and Bacchylides, Aeschylus and Simonides found a welcome at the court of Hiero. Polycrates was the patron of Anacreon, Periander of Arion. To Peisistratus has been attributed, possibly not without reason, the first critical edition of the text of Homer, a work as important in the literary history of Greece

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as was the issue of the Authorized Version of the Bible in English history. If we would judge fairly of tyranny, and of what it contributed to the development of Greece, we must remember how many states there were in whose history the period of greatest power coincides with the rule of a tyrant. This is unquestionably true of Corinth and Sicyon, as well as of Syracuse in the 5th, and again in the 4th, century ; it is probably true of Samos and Miletus. In the case of Athens it is only the splendour of the Great Age that blinds us to the greatness of the results achieved by the policy of the Peisistratids.

The Arts.

With the overthrow of this dynasty tyranny disappears from Greece proper for more than a century. During the century and a half which had elapsed since its first appearance the whole aspect of Greek life, and of the Greek world, had changed. The development was as yet incomplete, but the lines on which it was to proceed had been clearly marked out. Political power was no longer the monopoly of a class. The struggle between the "few" and the "many" had begun ; in one state at least (Athens) the victory of the "many" was assured. The first chapter in the history of democracy was already written. In the art of war the two innovations which were ultimately to establish the military supremacy of Greece, hoplite

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tactics and the trireme, had already been introduced. Greek literature was no longer synonymous with epic poetry. Some of its most distinctive forms had not yet been evolved ; indeed, it is only quite at the end of the period that prose-writing begins ; but both lyric and elegiac poetry had been brought to perfection. In art, statuary was still comparatively stiff and crude ; but in other branches, in architecture, in vase-painting, and in coin-types, the aesthetic genius of the race had asserted its pre-eminence. Philosophy, the supreme gift of Greece to the modern world, had become a living power. Some of her most original thinkers belong to the 6th century. Criticism had been applied to everything in turn : to the gods, to conduct, and to the conception of the universe. Before the Great Age begins, the claims of intellectual as well as of political freedom had been vindicated. It was not, however, in Greece proper that progress had been greatest. In the next century the centre of gravity of Greek civilization shifts to the western side of the Aegean ; in the 6th century it must be looked for at Miletus, rather than at Athens. In order to estimate how far the development of Greece had advanced, or to appreciate the distinctive features of Greek life at this period, we must study Ionia, rather than Attica or the Peloponnese. Almost all that is greatest and most characteristic is to be found on the eastern side of the Aegean. The great names in the

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history of science and philosophy before the beginning of the 5th century—Thales, Pythagoras, Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Anaximander, Hecataeus ; names which are representative of mathematics, astronomy, geography, and metaphysics, are all, without exception, Ionian. In poetry, too, the most famous names, if not so exclusively Ionian, are connected either with the Asiatic coast or with the Cyclades. Against Archilochus and Anacreon, Sappho and Alcaeus, Greece has nothing better to set, after the age of Hesiod, than Tyrtaeus and Theognis. Reference has already been made to the greatness of the Ionians as navigators, as colonizers, and as traders. In wealth and in population, Miletus, at the epoch of the Persian conquest, must have been far ahead of any city of European Greece. Sybaris, in Magna Graecia, can have been its only rival outside Ionia. There were two respects, however, in which the comparison was in favour of the mother-country. In warfare, the superiority of the Spartan infantry was unquestioned ; in politics, the Greek states showed a greater power of combination than the Ionian.

External Relations.

Finally, Ionia was the scene of the first conflicts with the Persian. Here were decided the first stages of a struggle which was to determine the place of Greece in the history of the world. The rise of Persia

EXTERNAL RELATIONS.

under Cyrus was, as Herodotus saw, the turning-point of Greek history. Hitherto, the Greek had proved himself indispensable to the oriental monarchies with which he had been brought into contact. In Egypt the power of the Saite kings rested upon the support of their Greek mercenaries. Amasis (569-525 B.C.), who is raised to the throne as the leader of a reaction against the influence of the foreign garrison, ends by showing greater favour to the Greek soldiery and the Greek traders than all that were before him. With Lydia the relations were originally hostile ; the conquest of the Greek fringe is the constant aim of Lydian policy. Greek influences, however, seem to have quickly permeated Lydia, and to have penetrated to the court. Alyattes (610-560 B.C.) marries an Ionian wife, and the succession is disputed between the son of this marriage and Croesus, whose mother was a Carian. Croesus (560-546 B.C.) secures the throne, only to become the lavish patron of Greek sanctuaries and the ally of a Greek state. The history of Hellenism had begun. It was the rise of Cyrus that closed the East to Greek enterprise and Greek influences. In Persia we find the antithesis of all that is characteristic of Greece—autocracy as opposed to liberty ; a military society organized on an aristocratic basis to an industrial society animated by a democratic spirit ; an army whose strength lay in its cavalry to an army in which the foot-soldier

alone counted ; a morality which assigned the chief place to veracity to a morality which subordinated it to other virtues ; a religion which ranks among the great religions of the world to a religion which appeared to the most spiritual minds among the Greeks themselves both immoral and absurd. Between two such races there could be neither sympathy nor mutual understanding.

The Persian Wars.

In the Great Age the Greek had learned to despise the Persian, and the Persian to fear the Greek. In the 6th century it was the Persian who despised, and the Greek who feared. The history of the conflicts between the Ionian Greeks and the Persian empire affords a striking example of the combination of intellectual strength and political weakness in the character of a people. The causes of the failure of the Ionians to offer a successful resistance to Persia, both at the time of the conquest by Harpagus (546-545 B.C.) and in the Ionic revolt (499-494 B.C.), are not far to seek. The centrifugal forces always tended to prove the stronger in the Greek system, and nowhere were they stronger than in Ionia. The tie of their tribal union proved weaker, every time it was put to the test, than the political and commercial interests of the individual states. A league of jealous commercial rivals is certain not to stand the strain of a protracted

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struggle against great odds. Against the advancing power of Lydia a common resistance had not so much as been attempted. Miletus, the greatest of the Ionian towns, had received aid from Chios alone. Against Persia a common resistance was attempted. The Panionium, the centre of a religious amphictyony, became for the moment the centre of a political league. At the time of the Persian conquest Miletus held aloof. She secured favourable terms for herself, and left the rest of Ionia to its fate. In the later conflict, on the contrary, Miletus is the leader in the revolt. The issue was determined, not as Herodotus represents it, by the inherent indolence of the Ionian nature, but by the selfish policy of the leading states. In the sea-fight at Lade (494 B.C.) the decisive battle of the war, the Milesians and Chians fought with desperate courage. The day was lost thanks to the treachery of the Samian and Lesbian contingents.

The causes of the successful resistance of the Greeks to the invasions of their country, first by Datis and Artaphernes (490 B.C.), in the reign of Darius, and then by Xerxes in person (480-479 B.C.), are more complex. Their success was partly due to a moral cause. And this was realized by the Greeks themselves. They felt (see Herod. vii. 104) that the subjects of a despot are no match for the citizens of a free state, who yield obedience to a law which is self-imposed. But the cause was not solely a moral one. Nor was the

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result due to the numbers and efficiency of the Athenian fleet, in the degree that the Athenians claimed (see Herod vii. 139). The truth is that the conditions, both political and military, were far more favourable to the Greek defence in Europe than they had been in Asia. At this crisis the centripetal forces proved stronger than the centrifugal. The moral ascendancy of Sparta was the determining factor. In Sparta the Greeks had a leader whom all were ready to obey (Herod. viii. 2.). But for her influence the forces of disintegration would have made themselves felt as quickly as in Ionia. Sparta was confronted with immense difficulties in conducting the defence against Xerxes. The two chief naval powers, Athens and Aegina, had to be reconciled after a long and exasperating warfare. After Thermopylae, the whole of northern Greece, with the exception of Athens and a few minor states, was lost to the Greek cause. The supposed interests of the Peloponnesians, who formed the greater part of the national forces, conflicted with the supposed interests of the Athenians. A more impartial view than was possible to the generation for which Herodotus wrote suggests that Sparta performed her task with intelligence and patriotism. The claims of Athens and Sparta were about equally balanced. And in spite of her great

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superiority in numbers,¹ the military conditions were far from favourable to Persia. A land so mountainous as Greece is was unsuited to the operations of cavalry, the most efficient arm of the service in the Persian army, as in most oriental ones. Ignorance of local conditions, combined with the dangerous nature of the Greek coast, exposed their ships to the risk of destruction; while the composite character of the fleet, and the jealousies of its various contingents, tended to neutralize the advantage of numbers. In courage and discipline, the flower of the Persian infantry was probably little inferior to the Greek; in equipment, they were no match for the Greek panoply. Lastly, Xerxes laboured under a disadvantage, which may be illustrated by the experience of the British Army in the South African War—distance from his base.

¹ The numbers given by Herodotus (upwards of 5,000,000) are enormously exaggerated. We must divide by ten or fifteen to arrive at a probable estimate of the forces that actually crossed the Hellespont. See J. A. R. Munro, *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, vol. xxii., pp. 294 and foll.

V.

THE GREAT AGE (480-338 B.C.)

The effects of the repulse of Persia were momentous in their influence upon Greece. The effects upon Elizabethan England of the defeat of the Spanish Armada would afford quite an inadequate parallel. It gave the Greeks a heightened sense, both of their own national unity and of their superiority to the barbarian, while at the same time it helped to create the material conditions requisite alike for the artistic and political development of the 5th century. Other cities besides Athens were adorned with the proceeds of the spoils won from Persia, and Greek trade benefited both from the reunion of Ionia with Greece, and from the suppression of piracy in the Aegean and the Hellespont. Do these developments justify us in giving to the period, which begins with the repulse of Xerxes and ends with the victory of Philip, the title of "the Great Age"? If the title is justified in the case of the 5th century, should the 4th century be excluded from the period? At first sight, the difference between the 4th century and the 5th may seem greater than that which exists between the 5th and the 6th. On the political side, the 5th century is an age of growth, the 4th an age of

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decay ; on the literary side, the former is an age of poetry, the latter an age of prose. In spite of these contrasts, there is a real unity in the period which begins with the repulse of Xerxes and ends with the death of Alexander, as compared with any preceding one. It is an age of maturity in politics, in literature, and in art ; and this is true of no earlier age. Nor can we say that the 5th century is, in all these aspects of Greek life, immature as compared with the 4th, or, on the other hand, that the 4th is decadent as compared with the 5th. On the political side, maturity is, in one sense, reached in the earlier century. There is nothing in the later century so great as the Athenian empire. In another sense, maturity is not reached till the 4th century. It is only in the later century that the tendency of the Greek constitutions to conform to a common type, democracy, is (at least approximately) realized, and it is only in this century that the principles upon which democracy is based are carried to their logical conclusion. In literature, if we confine our attention to poetry, we must pronounce the 5th century the age of completed development ; but in prose the case is different. The style even of Thucydides is immature, as compared with that of Isocrates and Plato. In Philosophy, however high may be the estimate that is formed of the genius of the earlier thinkers, it cannot be disputed that in Plato and Aristotle we find a more mature

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stage of thought. In art, architecture may perhaps be said to reach its zenith in the 5th, sculpture in the 4th century.

Systems of Government.

In its political aspect, the history of the Great Age resolves itself into the history of two movements, the imperial and the democratic. Hitherto Greece had meant, politically, an aggregate of independent states, very numerous, and, as a rule, very small. The principle of autonomy was to the Greek the most sacred of all political principles ; the passion for autonomy the most potent of political factors. In the latter half of the 6th century Sparta had succeeded in combining the majority of the Peloponnesian states into a loose federal union ; so loose, however, that it appears to have been dormant in the intervals of peace. In the crisis of the Persian invasion the Peloponnesian League was extended so as to include all the states which had espoused the national cause. It looked on the morrow of Plataea and Mycale (the two victories, won simultaneously, 479 B.C., by Spartan commanders, by which the danger from Persia was finally averted) as if a permanent basis for union might be found in the hegemony of Sparta. The sense of a common peril and a common triumph brought with it the need of a common union ; it was Athens, however, instead

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of Sparta, by whom the first conscious effort was made to transcend the isolation of the Greek political system and to bring the units into combination. The league thus founded (the Delian League, established in 477 B.C.) was under the presidency of Athens, but it included hardly any other state among those that had conducted the defence of Greece. It was formed, almost entirely, of the states which had been liberated from Persian rule by the great victories of the war. The Delian League, even in the form in which it was first established, as a confederation of autonomous allies, marks an advance in political conceptions upon the Peloponnesian League. Provision is made for an annual revenue, for periodical meetings of the council, and for a permanent executive. It is a real federation, though an imperfect one. There were defects in its constitution which rendered it inevitable that it should be transformed into an empire. Athens was from the first "the predominant partner." The fleet was mainly Athenian, the commanders entirely so; the assessment of the tribute was in Athenian hands; there was no federal court appointed to determine questions at issue between Athens and the other members; and, worst omission of all, the right of secession was left undecided. By the middle of the century the Delian League has become the Athenian empire. Henceforward the imperial idea, in one form or another, dominates Greek politics.

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Athens failed to extend her authority over the whole of Greece. Her empire was overthrown; but the triumph of autonomy proved the triumph of imperialism. The Spartan empire succeeds to the Athenian, and, when it is finally shattered at Leuctra (371 B.C.), the hegemony of Thebes, which is established on its ruins, is an empire in all but name. The decay of Theban power paves the way for the rise of Macedon.

Thus throughout this period we can trace two forces contending for mastery in the Greek political system. Two causes divide the allegiance of the Greek world, the cause of empire and the cause of autonomy. The formation of the confederacy of Delos did not involve the dissolution of the alliance between Athens and Sparta. For seventeen years more Athens retained her place in the league, "which had been established against the Mede" under the presidency of Sparta in 480 B.C. (Thuc. i. 102). The ascendancy of Cimon and the Philolaconian party at Athens was favourable to a good understanding between the two states, and at Sparta in normal times the balance inclined in favour of the party whose policy is best described by the motto "*quieta non movere*."

The Peloponnesian Wars.

In the end, however, the opposition of the two contending forces proved too strong for Spartan neutrality. The fall of Cimon (461 B.C.) was followed

THE PELOPONNESIAN WARS.

by the so-called "First Peloponnesian War," a conflict between Athens and her maritime rivals, Corinth and Aegina, into which Sparta was ultimately drawn. Thucydides regards the hostilities of these years (460-454 B.C.), which were resumed for a few months in 446 B.C., on the expiration of the Five Years' Truce, as preliminary to those of the great Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.). The real question at issue was in both cases the same. The tie that united the opponents of Athens was found in a common hostility to the imperial idea. It is a complete misapprehension to regard the Peloponnesian War as a mere duel between two rival claimants for empire. The ultimatum presented by Sparta on the eve of the war demanded the restoration of autonomy to the subjects of Athens. There is no reason for doubting her sincerity in presenting it in this form. It would, however, be an equal misapprehension to regard the war as merely a struggle between the cause of empire and the cause of autonomy. Corresponding to this fundamental contrast there are other contrasts, constitutional, racial, and military. The military interest of the war is largely due to the fact that Athens was a sea power and Sparta a land one. As the war went on, the constitutional aspect tended to become more marked. At first there were democracies on the side of Sparta, and oligarchies on the side of Athens. In the last stage of the war, when Lysander's influence

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was supreme, we see the forces of oligarchy everywhere united and organized for the destruction of democracy. In its origin the war was certainly not due to the rivalry of Dorian and Ionian. This racial, or tribal, contrast counted for more in the politics of Sicily than of Greece ; and, though the two great branches of the Greek race were represented respectively by the leaders of the two sides, the allies on neither side belonged exclusively to the one branch or the other. Still, it remains true that the Dorian states were, as a rule, on the Spartan side, and the Ionian states, as a rule, on the Athenian—a division of sentiment which must have helped to widen the breach, and to intensify the animosities.

The Athenian Empire.

As a political experiment the Athenian empire possesses a unique interest. It represents the first attempt to fuse the principles of imperialism and democracy. It is at once the first empire in history possessed and administered by a sovereign people, and the first which sought to establish a common system of democratic institutions amongst its subjects.¹

¹ It has been denied by some writers (*e.g.*, by A. H. J. Greenidge) that Athens interfered with the constitutions of the subject-states. For the view put forward in the text the following passages may be quoted : Aristotle, *Politics* 1307 b 20 ; Isocrates, *Panegyricus*, 105, 106 ; *Panathenaicus*, 54 and 68 ; Xenophon, *Hellenica*, iii. 4. 7 ; Ps.-Xen. *de Rep. Ath.* i. 14, iii. 10.

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It was an experiment that failed, partly owing to the inherent strength of the oligarchic cause, partly owing to the exclusive character of ancient citizenship. The Athenians themselves recognized that their empire depended for its existence upon the solidarity of democratic interests (see Thuc. iii. 47; Pseudo-Xenophon, *de Rep. Ath.* i. 14, iii. 10). An understanding existed between the democratic leaders in the subject-states and the democratic party at Athens. Charges were easily trumped up against obnoxious oligarchs, and conviction as easily obtained in the Athenian courts of law. Such a system forced the oligarchs into an attitude of opposition. How much this opposition counted for was realized when the Sicilian disaster (413 B.C.) gave the subjects their chance to revolt. The organization of the oligarchical party throughout the empire, which was effected by Lysander in the last stage of the war, contributed to the overthrow of Athenian ascendancy hardly less than the subsidies of Persia. Had Athens aimed at establishing a community of interest between herself and her subjects, based upon a common citizenship, her empire might have endured. It would have been a policy akin to that which secured the permanence of the Roman empire. And it was a policy which found advocates when the day for it was past (see Aristophanes, *Lysistrata*, 574 ff.; cf. the grant of citizenship to the Samians after Aegospotami, *C.I.A.*

iv. 2, 1b). But the policy pursued by Athens in the plentitude of her power was the reverse of the policy pursued by Rome in her treatment of the franchise. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the fate of the empire was sealed by the law of Pericles (451 B.C.), by which the franchise was restricted to those who could establish Athenian descent on both sides. It was not merely that the process of amalgamation through intermarriage was abruptly checked ; what was more serious was that a hard and fast line was drawn, once and for all, between the small body of privileged rulers and the great mass of unprivileged subjects. Maine (*Early Institutions*, lecture 13) has classed the Athenian empire with those of the familiar Oriental type, which attempt nothing beyond the raising of taxes and the levying of troops. The Athenian empire cannot, indeed, be classed with the Roman, or with the British rule in India ; it does not therefore deserve to be classed with the empires of Cyrus or Jenghiz Khan. Though the basis of its organization, like that of the Persian empire under Darius, was financial, it attempted, and secured, objects beyond the mere payment of tribute and the supply of ships. If Athens did not introduce a common religion, or a common system of education, or a common citizenship, she did introduce a common type of political institutions, and a common juris-

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diction.¹ She went some way, too, in the direction of establishing a common system of coins, and of weights and measures. A common language was there already. In a word, the Athenian empire marks a definite stage of political development.

The Mature Democracy.

The other great political movement of the age was the progress of democracy. Before the Persian invasion democracy was a rare phenomenon in Greek politics. Where it was found it existed in an undeveloped form, and its tenure of power was precarious. By the beginning of the Peloponnesian War it had become the prevalent form of government. The great majority of Greek states had adopted democratic constitutions. Both in the Athenian sphere of influence and in the colonial world outside that sphere democracy was all but the only form of constitution. It was only in Greece proper that oligarchy held its own. In the Peloponnese it could count a majority of the states; in northern Greece at least a half of them. The spread of democratic institutions was arrested by the victory of Sparta in the East, and the rise of Dionysius in the West. There was a moment

¹ The evidence seems to indicate that all the more important criminal cases throughout the empire were tried in the Athenian courts. In civil cases Athens secured to the citizens of the subject-states the right of suing Athenian citizens, as well as citizens of other subject-states.

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at the end of the 5th century when it looked as if democracy was a lost cause. Even Athens was for a brief period under the rule of the Thirty (404-403 B.C.). In the regions which had formed the empire of Athens the decarchies set up by Lysander were soon overthrown, and democracies restored in most cases, but oligarchy continued to be the prevalent form in Greece proper until Leuctra (371 B.C.), and in Sicily tyranny had a still longer tenure of power. By the end of the Great Age oligarchy has almost disappeared from the Greek world, except in the sphere of Persian influence. The Spartan monarchy still survives ; a few Peloponnesian states still maintain the rule of the few ; here and there in Greece itself we meet with a revival of the *tyrannis* ; but, with these exceptions democracy is everywhere the only type of constitution. And democracy has developed as well as spread. At the end of the 5th century the constitution of Cleisthenes, which was a democracy in the view of his contemporaries, had come to be regarded as an aristocracy (Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 29. 3). We can trace a similar change of sentiment in Sicily. As compared with the extreme form of constitution adopted at Syracuse after the defeat of the Athenian expedition, the democracies established two generations earlier, on the fall of the *tyrannis*, appeared oligarchical. The changes by which the character of the Greek democracies was revolutionized were four in number : the

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substitution of sortition for election, the abolition of a property qualification, the payment of officials, and the rise of a class of professional politicians. In the democracy of Cleisthenes no payment was given for service, whether as a magistrate, a juror, or a member of the Boulē. The higher magistracies were filled by election, and they were held almost exclusively by the members of the great Athenian families. For the highest office of all, the archonship, none but *Pentacosiomedimni* (the first of the four Solonian classes) were eligible. The introduction of pay and the removal of the property qualification formed part of the reforms of Pericles. Sortition had been instituted for election a generation earlier (487 B.C.).¹ What is perhaps the most important of all these changes, the rise of the demagogues, belongs to the era of the Peloponnesian War. From the time of Cleisthenes to the outbreak of the war every statesman of note at Athens, with the exception of Themistocles (and, perhaps, of Ephialtes), is of aristocratic birth. Down to the fall of Cimon the course of Athenian politics is to a great extent determined by the alliances and antipathies of the great clans. With the Pelopon-

¹ After this date, and partly in consequence of the change, the archonship, to which sortition was applied, loses its importance. The *Strategi* (generals) become the chief executive officials. As election was never replaced by the lot in their case, the change had less practical meaning than might appear at first sight.

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nesian War a new epoch begins. The chief office, the *Strategia*, is still as a rule, held by men of rank. But leadership in the *Ecclesia* has passed to men of a different class. The demagogues were not necessarily poor men. Cleon was a wealthy man; Eucrates, Lysicles and Hyperbolus were, at any rate, tradesmen rather than artisans. The first "labour member" proper is Cleophon (411-404 B.C.), a lyre-maker. They belonged, however, not to the land-owning, but to the industrial classes; they were distinguished from the older race of party-leaders by a vulgar accent and by violence of gesture in public speaking, and they found their supporters among the population of the city and its port, the *Peiraeus*, rather than among the farmers of the country districts. In the 4th century the demagogues, though under another name, that of orators, have acquired entire control of the *Ecclesia*. It is an age of professionalism, and the professional soldier has his counterpart in the professional politician. Down to the death of Pericles the party-leader had always held office as *Strategus*. His rival, Thucydides, son of Melesias, forms a solitary exception to this statement. In the 4th century the divorce between the general and the statesman is complete. The generals are professional soldiers, who aspire to no political influence in the state, and the statesmen devote themselves exclusively to politics, a career for which they have prepared themselves by

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a professional training in oratory or administrative work. The ruin of agriculture during the war had reduced the old families to insignificance. Birth counts for less than nothing as a political asset in the age of Demosthenes.

The City-State.

But great as are the contrasts which have been pointed out between the earlier and the later democracy, those that distinguish the ancient conception of democracy from the modern are of a still more essential nature. The differences that distinguish the democracies of ancient Greece from those of the modern world have their origin, to a great extent, in the difference between a city-state and a nation-state. Many of the most famous Greek states had an area of a few square miles ; the largest of them was no larger than an English county. Political theory put the limit of the citizen-body at 10,000. Though this number was exceeded in a few cases, it is doubtful if any state, except Athens, ever counted more than 20,000 citizens. In the nation-states of modern times democratic government is possible only under the form of a representative system ; in the city-state representative government was unnecessary, and therefore unknown. In the ancient type of democracy a popular chamber has no existence. The Ecclesia is not a chamber in any sense of the term ; it is an

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assembly of the whole people, which every citizen is entitled to attend, and in which every one is equally entitled to vote and speak. The question raised in modern political science, as to whether sovereignty resides in the electors or their representatives, has thus neither place nor meaning in ancient theory. In the same way, one of the most familiar results of modern analysis, the distinction between the executive and the legislative, finds no recognition in the Greek writers. In a direct system of government there can be no executive in the proper sense. Executive functions are discharged by the Ecclesia, to whose decision the details of administration may be referred. The position of the Strategi, the chief officials in the Athenian democracy of the 5th century, was in no sense comparable to that of a modern cabinet. Hence the individual citizen in an ancient democracy was concerned in, and responsible for, the actual work of government to a degree that is inconceivable in a modern state. Thus participation in the administrative and judicial business of the state is made by Aristotle the differentia of the citizen (*πολίτης ἐστὶν ὁ μετέχων κρίσεως καὶ ἀρχῆς*: Aristot. *Politics*, p. 1275 a 20). A large proportion of the citizens of Athens, in addition to frequent service in the courts of law, must in the course of their lives have held a magistracy, great or small, or have

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acted for a year or two as members of the Boulē.¹ It must be remembered that there was nothing corresponding to a permanent civil service in the ancient state. Much of the work of a government office would have been transacted by the Athenian Boulē. It must be remembered, too, that political and administrative questions of great importance came before the popular courts of law. Hence it follows that the ordinary citizen of an ancient democracy, in the course of his service in the Boulē or the law-courts, acquired an interest in political questions, and a grasp of administrative work, which none but a select few can hope to acquire under the conditions of the modern system. Where there existed neither a popular chamber nor a distinct executive, there was no opportunity for the growth of a party-system. There were, of course, political parties at Athens and elsewhere—oligarchs and democrats, conservatives and radicals, a peace-party and a war-party, according to the burning question of the day. There was, however, nothing equivalent to a general election, to a cabinet (or to that collective responsibility which is of the essence of a cabinet), or to the government and the opposition. Party organization, therefore, and a party system, in the proper sense, were never developed. Whatever may have been the evils incident to the ancient form

¹ For an estimate of the numbers annually engaged in the service of Athens, see Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 24. 3.

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of democracy, the "boss," the caucus, and the spoils-system were not among them.

Besides these differences, which, directly or indirectly, result from the difference of scale, there are others, hardly less profound, which are not connected with the size of the city-state. Perhaps the most striking contrast between the democracies of ancient and of modern times is to be found in their attitude towards privilege. Ancient democracy implies privilege; modern democracy implies its destruction. In the more fully developed democracies of the modern world (*e.g.* in the United States, or in Australia), the privilege of class is unknown; in most of them even the privilege of sex has been abolished. Ancient democracy was bound up with privilege as much as oligarchy was. The transition from the latter to the former was effected by enlarging the area of privilege and by altering its basis. In an oligarchical state citizenship might be confined to 10% of the free population; under a democracy 50% might enjoy it. In the former case the qualification might be wealth or land; in the latter case it might be, as it was at Athens, birth, *i.e.* descent, on both sides, from a citizen family. But in both cases alike, the distinction between a privileged and an unprivileged body of free-born residents is fundamental. To the unprivileged class belonged, not only foreigners temporarily resident (*ξένοι*) and

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aliens permanently domiciled (*μέτοικοι*), but also those native-born inhabitants of the state who were of foreign extraction, on one side or the other.¹ The privileges attaching to citizenship included, in addition to eligibility for office and a vote in the assembly, such private rights as that of owning land or a house, or of contracting a marriage with one of citizen status. The citizen, too, was alone the recipient of all the various forms of pay (*e.g.* for attendance in the assembly, for service in the Boulē or the law-courts, or for the celebration of the great festivals) which are so conspicuous a feature in the developed democracy of the 4th century. The *metoeci* could not even plead in a court of law in person, but only through a patron (*προστάτης*). It is intelligible that privileges so great should be jealously guarded. In the democracies of the modern world naturalization is easy; in those of ancient Greece admission to the franchise was rarely accorded.

Position of Women.

In modern times, again, we are accustomed to connect democracy with the emancipation of women. It is true that all democratic constitutions do not grant them the suffrage; but though they

¹ Foreign is not used here as equivalent to non-Hellenic. It means "belonging to another state, whether Greek or barbarian."

may be denied public rights, the growth of popular government has been almost everywhere accompanied by an extension of their private rights, and by the removal of the restrictions imposed by law, custom, or public opinion, upon their freedom of action. In ancient Greece the democracies were as illiberal in their policy as the oligarchies. Women of the respectable class were condemned to comparative seclusion. They enjoyed far less freedom in 4th-century Athens than in the Homeric Age. It is not in any of the democracies, but in conservative Sparta, that they possess privilege and exercise influence.

Slavery.

The most fundamental of all the contrasts between democracy in its ancient and in its modern form remains to be stated. The ancient state was inseparable from slavery. In this respect there was no difference between democracy and the other forms of government. No inconsistency was felt, therefore, between this institution and the democratic principle. Modern political theory has been profoundly affected by the conception of the dignity of labour; ancient political theory tended to regard labour as a disqualification for the exercise of political rights. Where slavery exists, the taint of it will inevitably cling to all labour that can be performed by the slave. In ancient Athens (which may be taken as typical of the

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Greek democracies) unskilled labour was almost entirely slave-labour, and skilled labour was largely so. The arts and crafts were, to some extent, exercised by citizens, but to a less extent in the 4th than in the 6th century. They were, however, chiefly left to aliens or slaves. The citizen-body of Athens in the age of Demosthenes has been stigmatised as consisting in great measure of salaried paupers. There is, doubtless, an exaggeration in this. It is, however, true both that the system of state-pay went a long way towards supplying the simple wants of a southern population, and that a large proportion of the citizens had time to spare for the service of the state. Had the life of the lower class of citizens been absorbed in a round of mechanical labours, as fully as is the life of our industrial classes, the working of an ancient democracy would have been impossible. In justice to the ancient democracies it must be conceded that, while popular government carried with it neither the enfranchisement of the alien nor the emancipation of the slave, the rights secured to both classes were more considerable in the democratic states than elsewhere. The lot of the slave, as well as that of the alien, was a peculiarly favourable one at Athens. The pseudo-Xenophon in the 5th century (*De rep. Ath.* i. 10-12) and Plato in the 4th (*Republic*, p. 563 B.) prove that the spirit of liberty with which Athenian life was permeated was not without its influence upon the

position of these classes. When we read that critics complained of the opulence of slaves, and of the liberties which they took, and when we are told that the slave could not be distinguished from the poorer class of citizens either by his dress or his look, we begin to realize the difference between the slavery of ancient Athens and the system as it was worked on the Roman *latifundia* or the plantations of the New World.

The Spartan Empire.

It had been anticipated that the fall of Athens would mean the triumph of the principle of autonomy. If Athens had surrendered within a year or so of the Sicilian catastrophe, this anticipation would probably have been fulfilled. It was the last phase of the struggle (412-404 B.C.) that rendered a Spartan empire inevitable. The oligarchical governments established by Lysander recognized that their tenure of power was dependent upon Spartan support, while Lysander himself, to whose genius, as a political organizer not less than as a commander, the triumph of Sparta was due, was unwilling to see his work undone. The Athenian empire had never included the greater part of Greece proper; since the Thirty Years' Peace its possessions on the mainland, outside the boundaries of Attica, were limited to Naupactus and Plataea. Sparta, on the other hand, attempted the control of the entire Greek world east of the

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Adriatic. Athens had been compelled to acknowledge a dual system ; Sparta sought to establish uniformity. The attempt failed from the first. Within a year of the surrender of Athens, Thebes and Corinth had drifted into an attitude of opposition, while Argos remained hostile. It was not long before the policy of Lysander succeeded in uniting against Sparta the very forces upon which she had relied when she entered on the Peloponnesian War. The Corinthian War (394-387 B.C.) was brought about by the alliance of all the second-class powers—Thebes, Athens, Corinth, Argos—against the one first-class power, Sparta. Though Sparta emerged successful from the war, it was with the loss of her maritime empire, and at the cost of recognizing the principle of autonomy as the basis of the Greek political system. It was already evident, thus early in the century, that the centrifugal forces were to prove stronger than the centripetal. Two further causes may be indicated which help to explain the failure of the Spartan empire. In the first place Spartan sea-power was an artificial creation. History seems to show that it is idle for a state to aspire to naval supremacy unless it possesses a great commercial marine. Athens had possessed such a marine ; her naval supremacy was due not to the mere size of her fleet, but to the numbers and skill of her seafaring population. Sparta had no commerce. She could build fleets more easily than

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she could man them. A single defeat (at Cnidus, 391 B.C.) sufficed for the ruin of her sea-power. The second cause is to be found in the financial weakness of the Spartan state. The Spartan treasury had been temporarily enriched by the spoils of the Peloponnesian War, but neither during that war nor afterwards did Sparta succeed in developing any scientific financial system. Athens was the only state which either possessed a large annual revenue or accumulated a considerable reserve. Under the conditions of Greek warfare, fleets were more expensive than armies. Not only was money needed for the building and maintenance of the ships, but the sailor must be paid, while the soldier served for nothing. Hence the power with the longest purse could both build the largest fleet, and attract the most skilful seamen.

The Theban Hegemony.

The battle of Leuctra transferred the hegemony from Sparta to Thebes, but the attempt to unite Greece under the leadership of Thebes was from the first doomed to failure. The conditions were less favourable to Thebes than they had been to Athens or Sparta. Thebes was even more exclusively a land power than Sparta. She had no revenue comparable to that of Athens in the preceding century. Unlike Athens and Sparta, she had not the advantage

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of being indented with a political cause. As the enemy of Athens in the 5th century, she was on the side of oligarchy ; as the rival of Sparta in the 4th, she was on the side of democracy ; but in her bid for primacy she could not appeal, as Athens and Sparta could, to a great political tradition, nor had she behind her, as they had, the moral force of a great political principle. Her position, too, in Boeotia itself was insecure. The rise of Athens was in great measure the result of the *synoecism* (συνοικισμός) of Attica. All inhabitants of Attica were Athenians. But "Boeotian" and "Theban" were not synonymous terms. The Boeotian league was an imperfect form of union, as compared with the Athenian state, and the claim of Thebes to the presidency of the league was, at best, sullenly acquiesced in by the other towns. The destruction of some of the most famous of the Boeotian cities, however necessary it may have been in order to unite the country, was a measure which at once impaired the resources of Thebes and outraged Greek sentiment. It has been often held that the failure of Theban policy was due to the death of Epaminondas (at the battle of Mantinea, 362 B.C.). For this view there is no justification. His policy had proved a failure before his death. Where it harmonized with the spirit of the age, the spirit of dissidence, it succeeded ; where it attempted to run counter to it, it failed. It succeeded in destroying

the supremacy of Sparta in the Peloponnese ; it failed to unite the Peloponnese on a new basis. It failed still more signally to unite Greece north of the Isthmus. It left Greece weaker and more divided than it found it (see the concluding words of Xenophon's *Hellenics*). It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of his policy as a destructive force ; as a constructive force it effected nothing.¹ The Peloponnesian system which Epaminondas overthrew had lasted two hundred years. Under Spartan leadership the Peloponnese had enjoyed almost complete immunity from invasion and comparative immunity from *stasis* (faction). The claim that Isocrates makes for Sparta is probably well-founded (*Archidamus*, 64-69 ; during the period of Spartan ascendancy the Peloponnesians were *εὐδαιμονέστατοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων*). Peloponnesian sentiment had been one of the chief factors in Greek politics ; to it, indeed, in no small degree was due the victory over Persia. The Theban victory at Leuctra destroyed the unity, and with it the peace and the prosperity, of the Peloponnese. It inaugurated a period of misery, the natural result of *stasis* and invasion, to which no parallel can be found in the earlier history (See Isocrates, *Archidamus*, 65, 66 ; the Peloponnesians were *ῥαλισμένοι ταῖς συμφοραῖς*). It destroyed, too, the Peloponnesian sentiment of

¹ It failed even to create a united Arcadia or a strong Messenia.

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hostility to the invader. The bulk of the army that defeated Mardonius at Plataea came from the Peloponnese ; at Chaeronea no Peloponnesian state was represented.

The Rise of Macedon.

The question remains, Why did the city-state fail to save Greece from conquest by Macedon ? Was this result due to the inherent weakness either of the city-state itself, or of one particular form of it, democracy ? It is clear, in any case, that the triumph of Macedon was the effect of causes which had long been at work. If neither Philip nor Alexander had appeared on the scene, Greece might have maintained her independence for another generation or two ; but, when invasion came, it would have found her weaker and more distracted, and the conquerors might easily have been less imbued with the Greek spirit, and less sympathetic towards Greek ideals, than the great Macedonian and his son. These causes are to be found in the tendencies of the age, political, economic, and moral. Of the two movements which characterized the Great Age in its political aspect, the imperial and the democratic, the one failed and the other succeeded. The failure and the success were equally fatal to the chances of Greece in the conflict with Macedon. By the middle of the 4th century Greek politics had come to be dominated by the theory of the balance power. This

theory, enunciated in its coarsest form by Demosthenes (*Pro Megalopolit.* 4: συμφέρει τῇ πόλει καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους ἀσθενεῖς εἶναι καὶ Θηβαίους; cf. in *Aristocrat.* 102, 103), had shaped the foreign policy of Athens since the end of the Peloponnesian War. As long as Sparta was the stronger, Athens inclined to a Theban alliance; after Leuctra she tended in the direction of a Spartan one. At the epoch of Philip's accession the forces were everywhere nicely balanced. The Peloponnese was fairly equally divided between the Theban and the Spartan interests, and central Greece was similarly divided between the Theban and the Athenian. Farther north we get an Athenian party opposed to an Olynthian in Chalcidice, and a republican party, dependent upon the support of Thebes, opposed to that of the tyrants in Thessaly. It is easy to see that the political conditions of Greece, both in the north and in the south, invited interference from without. And the triumph of democracy in its extreme form was ruinous to the military efficiency of Greece. On the one side there was a monarchical state, in which all powers, civil as well as military, were concentrated in the hands of a single ruler; on the other, a constitutional system, in which a complete separation had been effected between the responsibility of the statesman and that of the commander.¹

¹ See Demosthenes, *On the Crown*, 235: Philip was αὐτοκράτωρ, δεσπότης, ἡγεμών, κύριος πάντων.

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It could not be doubtful with which side victory would rest. Meanwhile, the economic conditions were steadily growing worse. The cause which Aristotle assigns for the decay of the Spartan state—a declining population (see *Politics*, p. 1270 a : ἀπώλετο ἡ πόλις τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων διὰ τὴν ὀλιγανθρωπίαν)—might be extended to the Greek world generally. The loss of population was partly the result of war and *stasis*—Isocrates speaks of the number of political exiles from the various states as enormous¹—but it was also due to a declining birth-rate, and to the exposure of infants. Aristotle, while condemning exposure, sanctions the procuring of abortion (*Politics*, 1335 b). It is probable that both ante-natal and post-natal infanticide were rife everywhere, except among the more backward communities. A people which has condemned itself to racial suicide can have little chance when pitted against a nation in which healthier instincts prevail. The materials for forming a trustworthy estimate of the population of Greece at any given epoch are not available; there is enough evidence, however, to prove that the military population of the leading Greek states at the era of the battle of Chaeronea (338 B.C.) fell far short of what it had been at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War.

¹ See *Archidamus*, 68; *Philippos*, 96 : ὥστε ῥᾶον εἶναι συστήσαι στρατόπεδον μείζον καὶ κρείττον ἐκ τῶν πλανωμένων ἢ ἐκ τῶν πολιτευμένων.

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The decline in population had been accompanied by a decline in wealth, both public and private ; and while revenues had shrunk, expenditure had grown. It was a century of warfare ; and warfare had become enormously expensive, partly through the increased employment of mercenaries, partly through the enhanced cost of material. The power of the purse had made itself felt even in the 5th century ; Persian gold had helped to decide the issue of the great war. In the politics of the 4th century the power of the purse becomes the determining factor. The public finance of the ancient world was singularly simple in character, and the expedients for raising a revenue were comparatively few. The distinction between direct and indirect taxation was recognized in practice, but states as a rule were reluctant to submit to the former system. The revenue of Athens in the 5th century was mainly derived from the tribute paid by her subjects ; it was only in time of war that a direct tax was levied upon the citizen-body.¹ In the age of Demosthenes the revenue derived from the Athenian Confederacy was insignificant. The whole burden of the expenses of a war fell upon the 1200 richest citizens, who were subject to direct taxation in the dual form of the *Trierarchy* and the *Eisphora* (property-tax). The revenue thus raised was wholly

¹ The *Liturgies* (e.g., the trierarchy) had much the same effect as a direct tax levied upon the wealthiest citizens.

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insufficient for an effort on a great scale ; yet the revenues of Athens at this period must have exceeded those of any other state.

It is to moral causes, however, rather than to political or economic ones, that the failure of Greece in the conflict with Macedon is attributed by the most famous Greek statesmen of that age. Demosthenes is never weary of insisting upon the decay of patriotism among the citizens and upon the decay of probity among their leaders. Venality had always been the besetting sin of Greek statesmen. Pericles' boast as to his own incorruptibility (Thuc. ii. 60) is significant as to the reputation of his contemporaries. In the age of Demosthenes the level of public life in this respect had sunk at least as low as that which prevails in many states of the modern world (see Demosth. *On the Crown*, 61 : *παρὰ τοῖς Ἑλλησιν, οὐ τισὶν ἀλλ' ἅπασιν ὁμοίως φερά πρὸς δωροδοκῶν καὶ δωροδόκων συνέβη*. Cf. §§ 295, 296). Corruption was certainly not confined to the Macedonian party. The best that can be said in defence of the patriots, as well as of their opponents, is that they honestly believed that the policy which they were bribed to advocate was the best for their country's interests. The evidence for the general decay of patriotism among the mass of the citizens is less conclusive. The battle of Megalopolis (331 B.C.), in which the Spartan soldiery "went down in a blaze of glory," proves that the spirit of the Lacede-

monian state remained unchanged. But at Athens it seemed to contemporary observers—to Isocrates equally with Demosthenes—that the spirit of the great days was extinct (see Isocr. *On the Peace*, 47, 48). It cannot, of course, be denied that public opinion was obstinately opposed to the diversion of the Theoric Fund to the purposes of the war with Philip. It was not till the year before Chaeronea that Demosthenes succeeded in persuading the assembly to devote the entire surplus to the expenses of the war.¹ Nor can it be denied that mercenaries were far more largely employed in the 4th century than in the 5th. In justice, however, to the Athenians of the Demosthenic era it should be remembered that the burden of direct taxation was rarely imposed, and was reluctantly endured, in the previous century. It must also be remembered that, even in the 4th century, the Athenian citizen was ready to take the field, provided that it was not a question of a distant expedition or of prolonged service.² For distant expeditions, or for prolonged service, a citizen-militia is unsuited. The substitution of a professional force for an unprofessional one is to be explained, partly by the

¹ His extreme caution in approaching the question at an earlier date is to be noticed. See *e.g.*, *Olynthiacs*, i. 19, 20.

² *e.g.* the two expeditions sent to Euboea, the cavalry force that took part in the battle of Mantinea, and the army that fought at Chaeronea. The troops in all these cases were citizens.

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change in the character of Greek warfare, and partly by the operation of the laws of supply and demand. There had been a time when warfare meant a brief campaign in the summer months against a neighbouring state. It had come to mean prolonged operations against a distant enemy.¹ Athens was at war, *e.g.*, with Philip, for eleven years continuously (357–346 B.C.). If winter campaigns in Thrace were unpopular at this epoch, they had been hardly less unpopular in the epoch of the Peloponnesian War. In the days of her greatness, too, Athens had freely employed mercenaries, but it was in the navy rather than the army. In the age of Pericles the supply of mercenary rowers was abundant, the supply of mercenary troops inconsiderable. In the age of Demosthenes incessant warfare and ceaseless revolution had filled Greece with crowds of homeless adventurers. The supply helped to create the demand. The mercenary was as cheap as the citizen-soldier, and much more effective. On the whole, then, it may be inferred that it is a mistake to regard the prevalence of the mercenary system as the expression of a declining patriotism. It would be nearer the mark to treat the transition from the voluntary to the professional system as cause rather than effect : as one among the causes which contributed to the decay of public spirit in the Greek world.

¹ For the altered character of warfare, see Demosthenes, *Philippics*, iii. 48, 49.

VI.

FROM ALEXANDER TO THE ROMAN CONQUEST (336-146 B.C.).

Federal Government.

In the history of Greece proper during this period the interest is mainly constitutional. It may be called the age of federation. Federation, indeed, was no novelty in Greece. Federal unions had existed in Thessaly, in Boeotia, and elsewhere, and the Boeotian league can be traced back at least to the 6th century. Two newly-founded federations, the Chalcidian and the Arcadian, play no inconsiderable part in the politics of the 4th century. But it is not till the 3rd century that federation attains to its full development in Greece, and becomes the normal type of polity. The two great leagues of this period are the Aetolian and the Achæan. Both had existed in the 4th century, but the latter, which had been dissolved shortly before the beginning of the 3rd century, becomes important only after its restoration in 280 B.C., about which date the former, too, first begins to attract notice. The interest of federalism lies in the fact that it makes an

advance beyond the conception of the city-state. It is an attempt to solve the problem which the Athenian empire failed to solve, the reconciliation of the claims of local autonomy with those of national union. The federal leagues of the 3rd century possess a further interest for the modern world, in that there can be traced in their constitutions a nearer approach to a representative system than is found elsewhere in Greek experience. A genuine representative system, it is true, was never developed in any Greek polity. What we find in the leagues is a sort of compromise between the principle of a primary assembly and the principle of a representative chamber. In both leagues the nominal sovereign was a primary assembly, in which every individual citizen had the right to vote. In both of them, however, the real power lay with a council (*βουλή*) composed of members representative of each of the component states.¹

Alexander's Empire.

The real interest of this period, however, is to be looked for elsewhere than in Greece itself. Alexander's career is one of the turning-points in history. He is one of the few to whom it has been given to modify the whole future of the human race. He originated two forces which have profoundly affected

¹ It is known that the councillors were appointed by the states in the Aetolian league; it is only surmised in the case of the Achæan.

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the development of civilization. He created Hellenism, and he created for the western world the monarchical ideal. Greece had produced personal rulers of ability, or even of genius ; but to the greatest of these, to Peisistratus, to Dionysius, even to Jason of Pherae, there clung the fatal taint of illegitimacy. As yet no ruler had succeeded in making the person of the monarch respectable. Alexander made it sacred. From him is derived, for the West, that "divinity that doth hedge a king." And in creating Hellenism he created, for the first time, a common type of civilization, with a common language, literature, and art, as well as a common form of political organization. In Asia Minor he was content to reinforce the existing Hellenic elements (cf. the case of Side, Arrian, *Anabasis*, i. 26. 4.) In the rest of the East his instrument of hellenization was the *polis*. He is said to have founded no less than seventy cities, destined to become centres of Greek influence ; and the great majority of these were in lands in which city-life was almost unknown. In this respect his example was emulated by his successors. The eastern provinces were soon lost, though Greek influences lingered on even in Bactria and across the Indus. It was only the regions lying to the west of the Euphrates that were effectively hellenized, and the permanence of this result was largely due to the policy of Rome. But after all deductions have been made, the great

fact remains that for many centuries after Alexander's death Greek was the language of literature and religion, of commerce and administration, throughout the Nearer East. Alexander had created a universal empire as well as a universal culture. His empire perished at his death, but its central idea survived—that of the municipal freedom of the Greek *polis* within the framework of an imperial system. Hellenistic civilization may appear degenerate when compared with Hellenic; when compared with the civilizations which it superseded in non-Hellenic lands, it marks an unquestionable advance. Greece left her mark upon the civilization of the West as well as upon that of the East, but the process by which her influence was diffused was essentially different. In the East, Hellenism came in the train of the conqueror, and Rome was content to build upon the foundations laid by Alexander. In the West, Greek influences were diffused by the Roman conquest of Greece. It was through the ascendancy which Greek literature, philosophy, and art acquired over the Roman mind that Greek culture penetrated to the nations of western Europe. The civilization of the East remained Greek. The civilization of the West became, and remained, Latin, but it was a Latin civilization that was saturated with Greek influences. The ultimate division, both of the empire and the church, into two halves finds its explanation in this original difference of culture.

APPENDIX I.

THE AUTHORITIES.

I.

THE EARLIEST PERIODS.

For the earliest periods of Greek history, the so-called Minoan and Mycenaean, the evidence is purely archaeological. For the next period, the Heroic or Homeric Age, the evidence is derived from the poems of Homer. In any estimate of the value of these poems as historical evidence, much will depend upon the view taken of the authorship, age, and unity of the poems. It cannot be questioned that the poems are evidence for the existence of a period in the history of the Greek race which differed from later periods in political and social, military and economic, conditions. But here agreement ends. If, as is generally held by German critics, the poems are not earlier than the 9th century, if they contain large interpolations of considerably later date, and if they are Ionian in origin, the authority of the poems becomes comparatively slight. The existence of different strata in the poems will imply the existence

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of inconsistencies and contradictions in the evidence ; nor will the evidence be that of a contemporary. It will also follow that the picture of the Heroic Age contained in the poems is an idealized one. The more extreme critics, *e.g.* Beloch, deny that the poems are evidence even for the existence of a pre-Dorian epoch. If, on the other hand, the poems are assigned to the 11th or 12th century, to a Peloponnesian writer, and to a period anterior to the Dorian Invasion and the colonization of Asia Minor (this is the view of the late Dr. D. B. Munro), the evidence becomes that of a contemporary, and the authority of the poems for the distribution of races and tribes in the Heroic Age, as well as for the social and political conditions of the poet's time, would be conclusive. Homer recognizes no Dorians in Greece, except in Crete (see *Odyssey*, xix. 177), and no Greek colonies in Asia Minor. Only two explanations are possible. Either there is deliberate archaism in the poems, or else they are earlier in date than the Dorian Invasion and the colonization of Asia Minor.

II.

FROM THE END OF THE HEROIC AGE TO THE END OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

Herodotus.

For the period that extends from the end of the Heroic Age to the end of the Peloponnesian War¹ the two principal authorities are Herodotus and Thucydides. Not only have the other historical works which treated of this period perished (those at least whose date is earlier than the Christian era), but their authority was secondary and their material chiefly derived from these two writers. In one respect then this period of Greek history stands alone. Indeed, it might be said, with hardly an exaggeration, that there is nothing like it elsewhere in history. Almost our sole authorities are two writers of unique genius, and they are writers whose works have come down to us intact. For the period which ends with the repulse of the Persian invasion our authority is Herodotus. For the period which extends from 478 to 411 we are

¹ Strictly speaking, to 411 B.C. For the last seven years of the war our principal authority is Xenophon, *Hellenica*, i., ii.

dependent upon Thucydides. In each case, however, a distinction must be drawn. The Persian Wars form the proper subject of Herodotus's work ; the Peloponnesian War is the subject of Thucydides. The interval between the two wars is merely sketched by Thucydides ; while of the period anterior to the conflicts of the Greek with the Persian, Herodotus does not attempt either a complete or a continuous narrative. His references to it are episodical and accidental. Hence our knowledge of the Persian Wars and of the Peloponnesian War is widely different in character from our knowledge of the rest of this period. In the history of these wars the *lacunae* are few ; in the rest of the history they are alike frequent and serious. In the history, therefore, of the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars little is to be learnt from the secondary sources. Elsewhere, especially in the interval between the two wars, they become relatively important.

In estimating the authority of Herodotus we must be careful to distinguish between the invasion of Xerxes and all that is earlier. Herodotus's work was published soon after 430 B.C., *i.e.* about half a century after the invasion. Much of his information was gathered in the course of the preceding twenty years. Although his evidence is not that of an eye-witness, he had had opportunities of meeting those who had themselves played a part in the war, on one side or the

other (*e.g.* Thersander of Orchomenos, ix. 16). In any case, we are dealing with a tradition which is little more than a generation old, and the events to which the tradition relates, the incidents of the struggle against Xerxes, were of a nature to impress themselves indelibly upon the minds of contemporaries. Where, on the other hand, he is treating of the period anterior to the invasion of Xerxes, he is dependent upon a tradition which is never less than two generations old, and is sometimes centuries old. His informants were, at best, the sons or grandsons of the actors in the wars (*e.g.* Archias the Spartan, iii. 55). Moreover, the invasion of Xerxes, entailing, as it did, the destruction of cities and sanctuaries, especially of Athens and its temples, marks a dividing line in Greek history. It was not merely that evidence perished and records were destroyed. What in reference to tradition is even more important, a new consciousness of power was awakened, new interests were aroused, and new questions and problems came to the front. The former things had passed away; all things were become new. A generation that is occupied with making history on a great scale is not likely to busy itself with the history of the past. Consequently, the earlier traditions became faint and obscured, and the history difficult to reconstruct. As we trace back the conflict between Greece and Persia to its beginnings and antecedents, we are

conscious that the tradition becomes less trustworthy as we pass back from one stage to another. The tradition of the expedition of Datis and Artaphernes is less credible in its details than that of the expedition of Xerxes, but it is at once fuller and more credible than the tradition of the Ionian revolt. When we get back to the Scythian expedition, we can discover but few grains of historical truth.

Much recent criticism of Herodotus has been directed against his veracity as a traveller. With this we are not here concerned. The criticism of him as an historian begins with Thucydides. Among the references of the latter writer to his predecessor are the following passages: i. 21; i. 22 *ad fin.*; i. 20 *ad fin.* (cf. Herod. ix. 53, and vi. 57 *ad fin.*); iii. 62 § 4 (cf. Herod. ix. 87); ii. 2 §§ 1 and 3 (cf. Herod. vii. 233); ii. 8 § 3 (cf. Herod. vi. 98). Perhaps the two clearest examples of this criticism are to be found in Thucydides's correction of Herodotus's account of the Cylonian conspiracy (Thuc. i. 126, cf. Herod. v. 71) and in his appreciation of the character of Themistocles—a veiled protest against the slanderous tales accepted by Herodotus (i. 138). In Plutarch's tract, "*On the Malignity of Herodotus*," there is much that is suggestive, although his general standpoint, viz. that Herodotus was in duty bound to suppress all that was discreditable to the valour or patriotism of the Greeks, is not that of the modern critic. It must be

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conceded to Plutarch that he makes good his charge of bias in Herodotus's attitude towards certain of the Greek states. The question, however, may fairly be asked, how far this bias is personal to the author, or how far it is due to the character of the sources from which his information was derived. He cannot, indeed, altogether be acquitted of personal bias. His work is, to some extent, intended as an *apologia* for the Athenian empire. In answer to the charge that Athens was guilty of robbing other Greek states of their freedom, Herodotus seeks to show, firstly, that it was to Athens that the Greek world, as a whole, owed its freedom from Persia, and secondly, that the subjects of Athens, the Ionian Greeks, were unworthy to be free. This leads him to be unjust both to the services of Sparta and to the qualities of the Ionian race. For his estimate of the debt due to Athens see vii. 139. For bias against the Ionians see especially iv. 142 (cf. Thuc. vi. 77) ; cf. also i. 143 and 146, vi. 12-14 (Lade), vi. 112 *ad fin.* A striking example of his prejudice in favour of Athens is furnished by vi. 91. At a moment when Greece rang with the crime of Athens in expelling the Aeginetans from their island, he ventures to trace in their expulsion the vengeance of heaven for an act of sacrilege nearly sixty years earlier. As a rule, however, the bias apparent in his narrative is due to the sources from which it is derived. Writing at Athens, in the first

years of the Peloponnesian War, he can hardly help seeing the past through an Athenian medium. It was inevitable that much of what he heard should come to him from Athenian informants, and should be coloured by Athenian prejudices. We may thus explain the leniency which he shows towards Argos and Thessaly, the old allies of Athens, in marked contrast to his treatment of Thebes, Corinth, and Aegina, her deadliest foes. For Argos *ci.* vii. 152; Thessaly, vii. 172-174; Thebes, vii. 132, vii. 233, ix. 87; Corinth (especially the Corinthian general Adeimantus, whose son Aristeus was the most active enemy of Athens at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War), vii. 5, vii. 21, viii. 29 and 61, vii. 94; Aegina, ix. 78-80 and 85. In his intimacy with members of the great Alcmaeonid house we probably have the explanation of his depreciation of the services of Themistocles, as well as of his defence of the family from the charges brought against it in connexion with Cylon and with the incident of the shield shown on Pentelicus at the time of Marathon (v. 71, vi. 121-124). His failure to do justice to the Cypselid tyrants of Corinth (v. 92), and to the Spartan king Cleomenes, is to be accounted for by the nature of his sources—in the former case, the tradition of the Corinthian oligarchy; in the latter, accounts, partly derived from the family of the exiled king Demaratus and partly representative of the view of the ephorate. Much of the earlier

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history is cast in a religious mould, *e.g.* the story of the Mermnad kings of Lydia in book i., or of the fortunes of the colony of Cyrene (iv. 145-167). In such cases we cannot fail to recognize the influence of the Delphic priesthood. Grote has pointed out that the moralizing tendency observable in Herodotus is partly to be explained by the fact that much of his information was gathered from priests and at temples, and that it was given in explanation of votive offerings, or of the fulfilment of oracles. Hence the determination of the sources of his narrative has become one of the principal tasks of Herodotean criticism. In addition to the current tradition of Athens, the family tradition of the Alcmaeonidae, and the stories to be heard at Delphi and other sanctuaries, there may be indicated the Spartan tradition, in the form in which it existed in the middle of the 5th century ; that of his native Halicarnassus, to which is due the prominence of its queen Artemisia ; the traditions of the Ionian cities, especially of Samos and Miletus (important both for the history of the Mermnadae and for the Ionian Revolt) ; and those current in Sicily and Magna Graecia, which were learned during his residence at Thurii (Sybaris and Croton, v. 44, 45 ; Syracuse and Gela, vii. 153-167). Among his more special sources we can point to the descendants of Demaratus, who still held, at the beginning of the 4th century, the principality in the Troad which had been granted to

their ancestor by Darius (Xen. *Hell.* iii. 1. 6), and to the family of the Persian general Artabazus, in which the satrapy of Dascylium (Phrygia) was hereditary in the 5th century.¹ His use of written material is more difficult to determine. It is generally agreed that the list of Persian satrapies, with their respective assessments of tribute (iii. 89-97), the description of the royal road from Sardis to Susa (v. 52-54), and of the march of Xerxes, together with the list of the contingents that took part in the expedition (vii. 26-131), are all derived from documentary and authoritative sources. From previous writers (*e.g.* Dionysius of Miletus, Hecataeus, Charon of Lampsacus, and Xanthus the Lydian) it is probable that he has borrowed little, though the fragments are too scanty to permit of adequate comparison. His references to monuments, dedicatory offerings, inscriptions, and oracles are frequent.

The chief defects of Herodotus are his failure to grasp the principles of historical criticism, to understand the nature of military operations, and to appreciate the importance of chronology. In place of historical criticism we find a crude rationalism (*e.g.* ii. 45, vii. 129, viii. 8). Having no conception of the distinction between occasion and cause, he is

¹ Possibly some of his information about Persian affairs may have been derived, at first or second hand, from Zopyrus, son of Megabyzus, whose flight to Athens is mentioned in iii. 160.

content to find the explanation of great historical movements in trivial incidents or personal motives. An example of this is furnished by his account of the Ionian revolt, in which he fails to discover the real causes either of the movement or of its result. Indeed, it is clear that he regarded criticism as no part of his task as an historian. In vii. 152 he states the principles which have guided him—ἐγὼ δὲ ὀφείλω λέγειν τὰ λεγόμενα, πείθεσθαι γε μὲν οὐ παντάπασι ὀφείλω, καί μοι τοῦτο τὸ ἔπος ἔχέτω ἐς πάντα λόγον. In obedience to this principle he again and again gives two or more versions of a story. We are thus frequently enabled to arrive at the truth by a comparison of the discrepant traditions. It would have been fortunate if all ancient writers who lacked the critical genius of Thucydides had been content to adopt the practice of Herodotus. His accounts of battles are always unsatisfactory.¹ The great battles, Marathon, Thermopylae, Salamis, and Plataea, present a series of problems. This result is partly due to the character of the traditions which he follows—traditions which were to some extent inconsistent or contradictory, and were derived from different sources; it is, however, in great measure due to his inability to think out a strategical combination or a tactical

¹ Among the many attempts on the part of modern writers to reconstruct the battles of the Persian Wars, much the ablest is that of J. A. R. Munro in a series of articles in the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, vols. XIX, XXII, XXIV.

movement. It is not too much to say that the battle of Plataea, as described by Herodotus, is wholly unintelligible. Most serious of all his deficiencies is his careless chronology. Even in the case of the 5th century, the data which he affords are inadequate or ambiguous. The interval between the Scythian expedition and the Ionian revolt is described by so vague an expression as *μετὰ δέ οὐ πολλὸν χρόνον ἄνεσις κακῶν ἦν* (v. 28). In the history of the revolt itself, though he gives us the interval between its outbreak and the fall of Miletus (*ἐκτῶ ἔτει* vi. 18), he does not give us the interval between this and the battle of Lade, nor does he indicate with sufficient precision the years to which the successive phases of the movement belong. Throughout the work professed synchronisms too often prove to be mere literary devices for facilitating a transition from one subject to another (cf. *e.g.* v. 81 with 89, 90; or vi. 51 with 87 and 94). In the 6th century, as Grote pointed out, a whole generation or more disappears in his historical perspective (cf. i. 30, vi. 125, v. 94, iii. 47, 48, v. 113 contrasted with v. 104 and iv. 162). The attempts to reconstruct the chronology of this century upon the basis of the data afforded by Herodotus (*e.g.* by Beloch, *Rheinisches Museum*, xlv., 1890, pp. 465-473) have completely failed.

In spite of all such defects Herodotus is an author, not only of unrivalled literary charm, but of the utmost

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value to the historian. If much remains uncertain or obscure, even in the history of the Persian Wars, it is chiefly to motives or policy, to topography or strategy, to dates or numbers, that uncertainty attaches. It is to these that a sober criticism will confine itself.

Thucydides.

Thucydides is at once the father of contemporary history and the father of historical criticism. From a comparison of i. 1, i. 22 and v. 26, we may gather both the principles to which he adhered in the composition of his work and the conditions under which it was composed. It is seldom that the circumstances of an historical writer have been so favourable for the accomplishment of his task. Thucydides was a contemporary of the Twenty-Seven Years' War in the fullest sense of the term. He had reached manhood at its outbreak, and he survived its close by at least half a dozen years. And he was more than a mere contemporary. As a man of high birth, a member of the Periclean circle, and the holder of the chief political office in the Athenian state, the *Strategia*, he was not only familiar with the business of administration and the conduct of military operations, but he possessed in addition a personal knowledge of those who played the principal part in the political life of the age. His exile in the year 424 afforded him

opportunities of visiting the scenes of distant operations (*e.g.* Sicily) and of coming in contact with the actors on the other side. He himself tells us that he spared no pains to obtain the best information available in each case. He also tells us that he began collecting materials for his work from the very beginning of the war. Indeed, it is probable that much of books i.-v. 24 was written soon after the Peace of Nicias (421), just as it is possible that the history of the Sicilian Expedition (books vi. and vii.) was originally intended to form a separate work. To the view, however, which has obtained wide support in recent years, that books i.-v. 22 and books vi. and vii. were separately published, the rest of book v. and book viii. being little more than a rough draught, composed after the author had adopted the theory of a single war of twenty-seven years' duration, of which the Sicilian Expedition and the operations of the years 431-421 formed integral parts, there seem to the present writer to be insuperable objections. The work, as a whole, appears to have been composed in the first years of the 4th century, after his return from exile in 404, when the material already in existence must have been revised and largely recast. There are exceedingly few passages, such as iv. 48. 5, which appear to have been overlooked in the process of revision. It can hardly be questioned that the impression left upon the reader's mind is that the

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point of view of the author, in all the books alike, is that of one writing after the fall of Athens.

The task of historical criticism in the case of the Peloponnesian War is widely different from its task in the case of the Persian Wars. It has to deal, not with facts as they appear in the traditions of an imaginative race, but with facts as they appeared to a scientific observer. Facts, indeed, are seldom in dispute. The question is rather whether facts of importance are omitted, whether the explanation of causes is correct, or whether the judgment of men and measures is just. Such inaccuracies as have been brought home to Thucydides on the strength, *e.g.* of epigraphic evidence are, as a rule, trivial. His most serious errors relate to topographical details, in cases where he was dependent on the information of others. Sphacteria (see G. B. Grundy, *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, xvi., 1896, p. 1) is a case in point. Nor have the difficulties connected with the siege of Plataea been cleared up either by Grundy or by others (see Grundy, *Topography of the Battle of Plataea*, &c., 1894). Where, on the contrary, he is writing at first hand his descriptions of sites are surprisingly correct. The most serious charge as yet brought against his authority as to matters of fact relates to his account of the Revolution of the Four Hundred, which appears, at first sight, to be inconsistent with the documentary evidence supplied by Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens*.

It may be questioned, however, whether the documents have been correctly interpreted by Aristotle. On the whole, it is probable that the general course of events was such as Thucydides describes (see E. Meyer, *Forschungen*, ii. 406-436), though he failed to appreciate the position of Theramenes and the Moderate party, and was clearly misinformed on some important points of detail. With regard to the omission of facts, it is unquestionable that much is omitted that would not be omitted by a modern writer. Such omissions are generally due to the author's conception of his task. Thus the internal history of Athens is passed over as forming no part of the history of the war. It is only where the course of the war is directly affected by the course of political events (*e.g.* by the Revolution of the Four Hundred) that the internal history is referred to. However much it may be regretted that the relations of political parties are not more fully described, especially in book v., it cannot be denied that from his standpoint there is logical justification even for the omission of the ostracism of Hyperbolus. There are omissions, however, which are not so easily explained. Perhaps the most notable instance is that of the raising of the tribute in 425 B.C.

Nowhere is the contrast between the historical methods of Herodotus and Thucydides more apparent than in the treatment of the causes of events. The

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distinction between the occasion and the cause is constantly present to the mind of Thucydides, and it is his tendency to make too little rather than too much of the personal factor. Sometimes, however, it may be doubted whether his explanation of the causes of an event is adequate or correct. In tracing the causes of the Peloponnesian War itself, modern writers are disposed to allow more weight to the commercial rivalry of Corinth; while in the case of the Sicilian expedition, they would actually reverse his judgment (ii. 65: *ὁ ἐς Σικελίαν πλοῦς ὃς οὐ τοσοῦτον γνώμης ἀμάρτημα ἦν πρὸς οὓς ἐπήεσαν*). To us it seems that the very idea of the expedition implied a gigantic miscalculation of the resources of Athens and of the difficulty of the task. His judgments of men and of measures have been criticized by writers of different schools and from different points of view. Grote criticized his verdict upon Cleon, while he accepted his estimate of the policy of Pericles. More recent writers, on the other hand, have accepted his view of Cleon, while they have selected for attack his appreciation alike of the policy and the strategy of Pericles. He has been charged, too, with failure to do justice to the statesmanship of Alcibiades.¹ There are cases, undoubtedly, in which the balance of recent opinion will be adverse to the view of Thucydides. There are

¹ For a defence of Thucydides' judgment on all three statesmen, see E. Meyer, *Forschungen*, ii. 296-379.

many more in which the result of criticism has been to establish it. That he should occasionally have been mistaken in his judgment and his views is certainly no detraction from his claim to greatness.

On the whole, it may be said that while the criticism of Herodotus, since Grote wrote, has tended seriously to modify our view of the Persian Wars, as well as of the earlier history, the criticism of Thucydides, in spite of its imposing bulk, has affected but slightly our view of the course of the Peloponnesian War. The labours of recent workers in this field have borne most fruit where they have been directed to subjects neglected by Thucydides, such as the history of political parties, or the organization of the empire (G. Gilbert's *Innere Geschichte Athens im Zeitalter des pel. Kreiges* is a good example of such work).

In regard to Thucydides' treatment of the period between the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars (the so-called *Pentecontaëteris*) it should be remembered that he does not profess to give, even in outline, the history of this period as a whole. The period is regarded simply as a prelude to the Peloponnesian War. There is no attempt to sketch the history of the Greek world or of Greece proper during this period. There is, indeed, no attempt to give a complete sketch of Athenian history. His object is to trace the growth of the Athenian Empire, and the

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causes that made the war inevitable. Much is therefore omitted not only in the history of the other Greek states, especially the Peloponnesian, but even in the history of Athens. Nor does Thucydides attempt an exact chronology. He gives us a few dates (*e.g.* surrender of Ithome, in the tenth year, i. 130; of Thasos, in the third year, i. 101; duration of the Egyptian expedition, six years, i. 110; interval between Tanagra and Oenophyta, 61 days, i. 108; revolt of Samos, in the sixth year after the Thirty Years' Truce, i. 115), but from these data alone it would be impossible to reconstruct the chronology of the period. In spite of all that can be gleaned from our other authorities, our knowledge of this, the true period of Athenian greatness, must remain slight and imperfect as compared with our knowledge of the next thirty years.

Diodorus.

Of the secondary authorities for this period the two principal ones are Diodorus (xi. 38 to xii. 37) and Plutarch. Diodorus is of value chiefly in relation to Sicilian affairs, to which he devotes about a third of this section of his work and for which he is almost our sole authority. His source for Sicilian history is the Sicilian writer Timaeus, an author of the 3rd century B.C. For the history of Greece proper during the Pentecontaetia Diodorus contributes compara-

tively little of importance. Isolated notices of particular events (*e.g.* the *Synoecism* of Elis, 471 B.C., or the foundation of Amphipolis, 437 B.C.), which appear to be derived from a chronological writer, may generally be trusted. The greater part of his narrative is, however, derived from Ephorus, who appears to have had before him little authentic information for this period of Greek history other than that afforded by Thucydides' work.

Plutarch.

Four of Plutarch's *Lives* are concerned with this period, viz., *Themistocles*, *Aristides*, *Cimon* and *Pericles*. From the *Aristides* little can be gained. Plutarch, in this biography, appears to be mainly dependent upon Idomeneus of Lampsacus, an excessively untrustworthy writer of the 3rd century B.C., who is probably to be credited with the invention of the oligarchical conspiracy at the time of the battle of Plataea (ch. 13), and of the decree of Aristides, rendering all four classes of citizens eligible for the archonship (ch. 22). The *Cimon*, on the other hand, contains much that is valuable; such as, *e.g.* the account of the battle of the Eurymedon (chs. 12 and 13). To the *Pericles* we owe several quotations from the Old Comedy. Two other of the *Lives*, *Lycurgus* and *Solon*, are amongst our most important sources for the early history of Sparta and Athens respectively.

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Of the two (besides *Pericles*) which relate to the Peloponnesian War, the *Alcibiades* adds little to what can be gained from Thucydides and Xenophon ; the *Nicias*, on the other hand, supplements Thucydides' narrative of the Sicilian expedition with many valuable details, which, it may safely be assumed, are derived from the contemporary historian, Philistus of Syracuse. Amongst the most valuable material afforded by Plutarch are the quotations, which occur in almost all the *Lives*, from the collection of Athenian decrees (ψηφισμάτων συναγωγή) formed by the Macedonian writer Craterus, in the 3rd century B.C.

The "Constitutions."

Two other works may be mentioned in connexion with the history of Athens. For the history of the Athenian Constitution down to the end of the 5th century B.C. Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens* is our chief authority. The other *Constitution of Athens*, erroneously attributed to Xenophon, a tract of singular interest both on literary and historical grounds, throws a good deal of light on the internal condition of Athens, and on the system of government, both of the state and of the empire, in the age of the Peloponnesian War, during the earlier years of which it was composed.

Inscriptions.

To the literary sources for the history of Greece,

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especially of Athens, in the 5th century B.C. must be added the epigraphic. Few inscriptions have been discovered which date back beyond the Persian Wars. For the latter half of the 5th century they are both numerous and important. Of especial value are the series of Quota-lists, from which can be calculated the amount of tribute paid by the subject-allies of Athens from the year 454 B.C. onwards. The great majority of the inscriptions of this period are of Athenian origin. Their value is enhanced by the fact that they relate, as a rule, to questions of organization, finance and administration, as to which little information is to be gained from the literary sources.

For the period between the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*, iii. 1, is indispensable. Hill's *Sources of Greek History*, B.C. 478-431 (Oxford, 1897) is excellent. It gives the most important inscriptions in a convenient form.

III.

THE FOURTH CENTURY TO THE DEATH OF ALEXANDER.

Xenophon.

Of the historians who flourished in the 4th century the sole writer whose works have come down to us is Xenophon. It is a singular accident of fortune that neither of the two authors who at once were most representative of their age and did most to determine the views of Greek history current in subsequent generations, Ephorus and Theopompus, should be extant. It was from them, rather than from Herodotus, Thucydides, or Xenophon that the Roman world obtained its knowledge of the history of Greece in the past, and its conception of its significance. Both were pupils of Isocrates, and both, therefore, bred up in an atmosphere of rhetoric. Hence their popularity and their influence. The scientific spirit of Thucydides was alien to the temper of the 4th century, and hardly more congenial to the age of Cicero or Tacitus. To the rhetorical spirit, which is common to both, each added defects peculiar to himself. Theopompus is a strong partisan, a sworn foe to Athens and to Democracy. Ephorus, though a military historian, is

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ignorant of the art of war. He is also incredibly careless and uncritical. It is enough to point to his description of the battle of the Eurymedon (Diodorus xi. 60-62), in which, misled by an epigram which he supposed to relate to this engagement (it really refers to the Athenian victory off Salamis in Cyprus, 449 B.C.), he makes the coast of Cyprus the scene of Cimon's naval victory, and finds no difficulty in putting it on the same day as the victory on shore on the banks of the Eurymedon, in Pamphylia. Only a few fragments remain of either writer,¹ but Theopompus was largely used by Plutarch in several of the *Lives*, while Ephorus continues to be the main source of Diodorus' history, as far as the outbreak of the Sacred War (Fragments of Ephorus in Müller's *Fragmenta historicorum Graecorum*, vol. I.; of Theopompus in *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, cum Theopompi et Cratippi fragmentis*, ed. B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt, 1909).

It may be at least claimed for Xenophon that he is free from all taint of the rhetorical spirit. It may also be claimed for him that, as a witness, he is both honest and well-informed. But, if there is no justification for the charge of deliberate falsification, it cannot be denied that he had strong political prejudices, and that his narrative has suffered from them.

¹ In the opinion of the present writer the so-called *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* is part of Ephorus' *History*. Cf. also Oxyrhynchus Papyri, fragments 1365 and 1610.

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His historical writings are the *Anabasis*, an account of the expedition of the Ten Thousand, the *Hellenica*, and the *Agesilaus*, a panegyric of the Spartan king. Of these the *Hellenica* is far the most important for the student of history. It consists of two distinct parts (though there is no ground for the theory that the two parts were separately written and published), books i. and ii., and books iii. to vii. The first two books are intended as a continuation of Thucydides' work. They begin, quite abruptly, in the middle of the Attic year 411/10, and they carry the history down to the fall of the Thirty, in 403. Books iii. to vii., the *Hellenica* proper, cover the period from 401 to 362, and give the histories of the Spartan and Theban hegemonies down to the death of Epaminondas. There is thus a gap of two years between the point at which the first part ends and that at which the second part begins. The two parts differ widely, both in their aim and in the arrangement of the material. In the first part Xenophon attempts, though not with complete success, to follow the chronological method of Thucydides, and to make each successive spring, when military and naval operations were resumed after the winter's interruption, the starting-point of a fresh section. The resemblance between the two writers ends, however, with the outward form of the narrative. All that is characteristic of Thucydides is absent in Xenophon. The latter writer shows

neither skill in portraiture, nor insight into motives. He is deficient in the sense of proportion and of the distinction between occasion and cause. Perhaps his worse fault is a lack of imagination. To make a story intelligible it is necessary sometimes to put oneself in the reader's place, and to appreciate his ignorance of circumstances and events which would be perfectly familiar to the actors in the scene or to contemporaries. It was not given to Xenophon, as it was to Thucydides, to discriminate between the circumstances that are essential and those that are not essential to the comprehension of the story. In spite, therefore, of its wealth of detail, his narrative is frequently obscure. It is quite clear that in the trial of the generals, *e.g.* something is omitted. It may be supplied as Diodorus has supplied it (xiii. 101), or it may be supplied otherwise. It is probable that, when under cross-examination before the council, the generals, or some of them, disclosed the commission given to Theramenes and Thrasybulus. The important point is that Xenophon himself has omitted to supply it. As it stands his narrative is unintelligible. In the first two books, though there are omissions (*e.g.* the loss of Nisaea, 409 B.C.), they are not so serious as in the last five, nor is the bias so evident. It is true that if the account of the rule of the Thirty given in Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens* be accepted, Xenophon must have deliberately misrepresented the course of events

to the prejudice of Theramenes. But it is at least doubtful whether Aristotle's version can be sustained against Xenophon's, though it may be admitted, not only that there are mistakes as to details in the latter writer's narrative, but that less than justice is done to the policy and motives of the "Buskin." The *Hellenica* was written, it should be remembered, at Corinth, after 362. More than forty years had thus elapsed since the events recorded in the first two books, and after so long an interval accuracy of detail, even where the detail is of importance, is not always to be expected.¹ In the second part the chronological method is abandoned. A subject once begun is followed out to its natural ending, so that sections of the narrative which are consecutive in order are frequently parallel in point of date. A good example of this will be found in book iv. In chapters 2 to 7 the history of the Corinthian war is carried down to the end of 390, so far as the operations on land are concerned, while chapter 8 contains an account of the naval operations from 394 to 388. In this second part of the *Hellenica* the author's disqualifications for his task are more apparent than in the first two books. The more he is acquitted of bias in his selection of events and in his omissions, the more clearly

¹ On the discrepancies between Xenophon's account of the Thirty and Aristotle's, see G. Busolt, *Hermes* (1898), pp. 71-86.

does he stand convicted of lacking all sense of the proportion of things. Down to Leuctra (371 B.C.) Sparta is the centre of interest, and it is of the Spartan state alone that a complete or continuous history is given. After Leuctra, if the point of view is no longer exclusively Spartan, the narrative of events is hardly less incomplete. Throughout the second part of the *Hellenica* omissions abound which it is difficult either to explain or justify. The formation of the Second Athenian Confederacy of 377 B.C., the foundation of Megalopolis, and the restoration of the Messenian state are all left unrecorded. Yet the writer who passes them over without mention thinks it worth while to devote more than one-sixth of an entire book to a chronicle of the unimportant feats of the citizens of the petty state of Phlius. Nor is any attempt made to appraise the policy of the great Theban leaders, Pelopidas and Epaminondas. The former, indeed, is mentioned only in a single passage, relating to the embassy to Susa in 368 ; the latter does not appear on the scene till a year later, and receives mention but twice before the battle of Mantinea. An author who omits from his narrative some of the most important events of his period, and elaborates the portraiture of an Agesilaus while not attempting the bare outline of an Epaminondas, may be honest ; he may even write without a consciousness of bias ; he

certainly cannot rank among the great writers of history.¹

Diodorus.

For the history of the 4th century Diodorus assumes a higher degree of importance than belongs to him in the earlier periods. This is partly to be explained by the deficiencies of Xenophon's *Hellenica*, partly by the fact that for the interval between the death of Epaminondas and the accession of Alexander we have in Diodorus alone a continuous narrative of events. Books xiv. and xv. of his history include the period covered by the *Hellenica*. More than half of book xiv. is devoted to the history of Sicily and the reign of Dionysius, the tyrant of Syracuse. For this period of Sicilian history he is, practically, our sole authority. In the rest of the book, as well as in book xv., there is much of value, especially in the notices of Macedonian history. Thanks to Diodorus we are enabled to supply many of the omissions of the *Hellenica*. Diodorus is, *e.g.*, our sole literary authority for the Athenian naval confederation of 377. Book xvi. must rank, with the *Hellenica* and Arrian's *Anabasis*, as one of the three principal authorities for this century, so far,

¹ The fragment of the New Historian (*Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, vol. v.) affords exceedingly important material for the criticism of Xenophon's narrative. Cf. my *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, Lecture v.

at least, as works of an historical character are concerned. It is our authority for the Social and the Sacred Wars, as well as for the reign of Philip. It is a curious irony of fate that, for what is perhaps the most momentous epoch in the history of Greece, we should have to turn to a writer of such inferior capacity. For this period his material is better and his importance greater : his intelligence is as limited as ever. Who but Diodorus would be capable of narrating the siege and capture of Methone twice over, once under the year 354 and again under the year 352 (xvi. 31 and 34 ; cf. xii. 35 and 42 ; Archidamus dies in 434, yet commands Peloponnesian army in 431) ; or of giving three different numbers of years (eleven, ten, and nine) in three different passages (chs. 14, 23, and 59) for the length of the Sacred War ; or of asserting the conclusion of peace between Athens and Philip in 340, after the failure of his attack on Perinthus and Byzantium ? Amongst the subjects which are omitted is the Peace of Philocrates. For the earlier chapters, which bring the narrative down to the outbreak of the Sacred War, Ephorus, as in the previous books, is Diodorus' main source. His source for the rest of the book, *i.e.* for the greater part of Philip's reign, cannot be determined. It is generally agreed that it is not the *Philippica* of Theopompus.

Historians of Alexander's reign.

For the reign of Alexander our earliest extant authority is Diodorus, who belongs to the age of Augustus. Of the others, Q. Curtius Rufus, who wrote in Latin, lived in the reign of the emperor Claudius, Arrian and Plutarch in the 2nd century A.D. Yet Alexander's reign is one of the best known periods of ancient history. The Peloponnesian War and the twenty years of Roman history which begin with 63 B.C. are the only two periods which we can be said to know more fully, or for which we have more trustworthy evidence. For there is no period of ancient history which was recorded by a larger number of contemporary writers, or for which better or more abundant materials were available. Of the writers actually contemporary with Alexander there were five of importance—Ptolemy, Aristobulus, Callisthenes, Onesicritus, and Nearchus; and all of them occupied positions which afforded exceptional opportunities of ascertaining the facts. Four of them were officers in Alexander's service. Ptolemy, the future king of Egypt, was one of the *Somatophylaces* (we may, perhaps regard them as corresponding to Napoleon's Marshals); Aristobulus was also an officer of high rank (see Arrian, *Anab.* vi. 29. 10); Nearchus was admiral of the fleet which surveyed the Indus and the Persian Gulf, and Onesicritus was one of his

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subordinates. The fifth, Callisthenes, a pupil of Aristotle, accompanied Alexander on his march down to his death in 327, and was admitted to the circle of his intimate friends. A sixth historian, Clitarchus, was possibly also a contemporary ; at any rate, he is not more than a generation later. These writers had at their command a mass of official documents, such as the βασιλικοὶ ἐφημερίδες—the *Gazette* and *Court Circular* combined—edited and published after Alexander's death by his secretary, Eumenes of Cardia ; the σταθμοί, or records of the marches of the armies, which were carefully measured at the time ; and the official reports on the conquered provinces. That these documents were made use of by the historians is proved by the references to them which are to be found in Arrian, Plutarch, and Strabo ; e.g. Arrian, *Anab.* vii. 25 and 26, and Plutarch, *Alexander* 76 (quotation from the βασιλικοὶ ἐφημερίδες) ; Strabo xv. 723 (reference to the σταθμοί), ii. 69 (reports drawn up on the various provinces). We have, in addition, in Plutarch numerous quotations from Alexander's correspondence with his mother, Olympias, and with his officers. The contemporary historians may be roughly divided into two groups. On the one hand there are Ptolemy and Aristobulus, who, except in a single instance, are free from all suspicion of deliberate invention. On the other hand, there are Callisthenes, Onesicritus, and Clitarchus,

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whose tendency is rhetorical. Nearchus appears to have allowed full scope to his imagination in dealing with the wonders of India, but to have been otherwise veracious. Of the extant writers, Arrian is incomparably the most valuable. His merits are twofold. As the commander of Roman legions and the author of a work on tactics, he combined a practical with a theoretical knowledge of the military art, while the writers whom he follows in the *Anabasis* are the two most worthy of credit, Ptolemy and Aristobulus. We may well hesitate to call in question the authority of writers who exhibit an agreement which it would be difficult to parallel elsewhere in the case of two independent historians. It may be inferred from Arrian's references to them that there were only eleven cases in all in which he found discrepancies between them. The most serious drawback which can be alleged against them is an inevitable bias in Alexander's favour. It would be only natural that they should pass over in silence the worst blots on their great commander's fame. Next in value to the *Anabasis* comes Plutarch's *Life of Alexander*, the merits of which, however, are not to be gauged by the influence which it has exercised upon literature. The *Life* is a valuable supplement to the *Anabasis*, partly because Plutarch, as he is writing biography rather than history (for his conception of the difference between the two see the famous preface, *Life of Alexander*, ch. i.), is con-

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cerned to record all that will throw light upon Alexander's character (*e.g.* his epigrammatic sayings, and quotations from his letters); partly because he tells us much about his early life, before he became king, while Arrian tells us nothing. It is unfortunate that Plutarch writes in an uncritical spirit; it is hardly less unfortunate that he should have formed no clear conception, and drawn no consistent picture, of Alexander's character. Book xvii. of Diodorus and the *Historiae Alexandri* of Curtius Rufus are thoroughly rhetorical in spirit. It is probable that in both cases the ultimate source is the work of Clitarchus.

The Orators.

It is towards the end of the 5th century that a fresh source of information becomes available in the speeches of the orators, the earliest of whom is Antiphon (d. 411 B.C.). Lysias is of great importance for the history of the Thirty (see the speeches against Eratosthenes and Agoratus), and a good deal may be gathered from Andocides with regard to the last years of the 5th and the opening years of the next century. At the other end of this period Lycurgus, Hyperides, and Dinarchus throw light upon the time of Philip and Alexander. The three, however, who are of most importance to the historian, are Isocrates, Aeschines, and Demosthenes.

Isocrates.

Isocrates, whose long life (436-338) more than spans the interval between the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War and the triumph of Macedon at Chaeronea, is one of the most characteristic figures in the Greek world of his day. To comprehend that world the study of Isocrates is indispensable; for in an age dominated by rhetoric he is the prince of rhetoricians. It is difficult for a modern reader to do him justice, so alien is his spirit, and the spirit of his age, from ours. It must be allowed that he is frequently monotonous and prolix; at the same time it must not be forgotten that, as the most famous representative of rhetoric, he was read from one end of the Greek world to the other. He was the friend of Evagoras and Archidamus, of Dionysius and Philip; he was the master of Aeschines and Lycurgus amongst orators and of Ephorus and Theopompus amongst historians. No other contemporary writer has left so indelible a stamp upon the style and the sentiment of his generation. It is a commonplace that Isocrates is the apostle of Panhellenism. It is not so generally recognized that he is the prophet of Hellenism. A passage in the *Panegyricus* (§ 50 ὥστε τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὄνομα μήκετι τοῦ γένους ἀλλὰ τῆς διανοίας δοκεῖν εἶναι καὶ μᾶλλον Ἑλλήνας καλεῖσθαι τοὺς τῆς παιδείας τῆς ἡμετέρας ἢ τοὺς τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως μετέχοντας)

is the key to the history of the next three centuries. Doubtless he had no conception of the extent to which the East was to be hellenized. He was, however, the first to recognize that it would be hellenized by the diffusion of Greek culture rather than of Greek blood. His Panhellenism was the outcome of his recognition of the new forces and tendencies which were at work in the midst of a new generation. When Greek culture was becoming more and more international, the exaggeration of the principle of autonomy in the Greek political system was becoming more and more absurd. He had sufficient insight to be aware that the price paid for this autonomy was the domination of Persia ; a domination which meant the servitude of the Greek states across the Aegean and the demoralization of Greek political life at home. His Panhellenism led him to a more liberal view of the distinction between what was Greek and what was not than was possible to the intenser patriotism of a Demosthenes. In his later orations he has the courage not only to pronounce that the day of Athens as a first-rate power is past, but to see in Philip the needful leader in the crusade against Persia. The earliest and greatest of his political orations is the *Panegyricus*, published in 380 B.C., midway between the peace of Antalcidas and Leuctra. It is his *apologia* for Panhellenism. To the period of the Social War belong the *De pace* (355 B.C.)

and the *Areopagiticus* (354 B.C.), both of great value as evidence for the internal conditions of Athens at the beginning of the struggle with Macedon. The *Plataicus* (373 B.C.) and the *Archidamus* (366 B.C.) throw light upon the politics of Boeotia and the Peloponnese respectively. The *Panathenaicus* (339 B.C.), the child of his old age, contains little that may not be found in the earlier orations. The *Philippus* (346 B.C.) is of peculiar interest, as giving the views of the Macedonian party.

Demosthenes.

Not the least remarkable feature in recent historical criticism is the reaction against the view which was at one time almost universally accepted of the character, statesmanship, and authority of the orator Demosthenes. During the last quarter of a century his character and statesmanship have been attacked, and his authority impugned, by a series of writers of whom Holm and Beloch are the best known. With the estimate of his character and statesmanship we are not here concerned. With regard to his value as an authority for the history of the period, it is to his speeches, and to those of his contemporaries, Aeschines, Hyperides, Dinarchus, and Lycurgus, that we owe our intimate knowledge, both of the working of the constitutional and legal systems, and of the life of the people, at this period of Athenian history.

From this point of view his value can hardly be overestimated. As a witness, however, to matters of fact, his authority can no longer be rated as highly as it once was, *e.g.* by Schaefer and Grote. The orator's attitude towards events, both in the past and in the present, is inevitably a different one from the historian's. The object of a Thucydides is to ascertain a fact, or to exhibit it in its true relations. The object of a Demosthenes is to make a point, or to win his case. In their dealings with the past the orators exhibit a levity which is almost inconceivable to a modern reader. Andocides, in a passage of his speech *On the Mysteries* (§ 107), speaks of Marathon as the crowning victory of Xerxes' campaign; in his speech *On the Peace* (§ 3) he confuses Miltiades with Cimon, and the Five Years' Peace with the Thirty Years' Truce. Though the latter passage is a mass of absurdities and confusions, it was so generally admired that it was incorporated by Aeschines in his speech *On the Embassy* (§§ 172-176). If such was their attitude towards the past; if, in order to make a point, they do not hesitate to pervert history, is it likely that they would conform to a higher standard of veracity in their statements as to the present—as to their contemporaries, their rivals, or their own actions? When we compare different speeches of Demosthenes, separated by an interval of years, we cannot fail to observe a marked difference in his

statements. The further he is from the events, the bolder are his mis-statements. It is only necessary to compare the speech *On the Crown* with that *On the Embassy*, and this latter speech with the *Philippics* and *Olynthiacs*, to find illustrations. It has come to be recognized that no statement as to a matter of fact is to be accepted, unless it receives independent corroboration, or unless it is admitted by both sides. The speeches of Demosthenes may be conveniently divided into four classes according to their dates. To the pre-Philippic period belong the speeches *On the Symmories* (354 B.C.), *On Megalopolis* (352 B.C.), *Against Aristocrates* (351 B.C.), and, perhaps, the speech *On Rhodes* (? 351 B.C.). These speeches betray no consciousness of the danger threatened by Philip's ambition. The policy recommended is one based upon the principle of the balance of power. To the succeeding period, which ends with the peace of Philocrates (346 B.C.), belong the *First Philippic* and the three *Olynthiacs*. To the period between the peace of Philocrates and Chaeronea belong the speech *On the Peace* (346 B.C.), the *Second Philippic* (344 B.C.), the speeches *On the Embassy* (344 B.C.), and *On the Chersonese* (341 B.C.), and the *Third Philippic*. The masterpiece of his genius, the speech *On the Crown*, was delivered in 330 B.C., in the reign of Alexander. Of the three extant speeches of Aeschines that *On the Embassy* is of great value, as enabling us to correct

the mis-statements of Demosthenes. For the period from the death of Alexander to the fall of Corinth (323-146 B.C.) our literary authorities are singularly defective. For the Diadochi Diodorus (books xviii.-xx.) is our chief source. These books form the most valuable part of Diodorus' work. They are mainly based upon the work of Hieronymus of Cardia, a writer who combined exceptional opportunities for ascertaining the truth (he was in the service first of Eumenes, and then of Antigonus) with an exceptional sense of its importance. Hieronymus ended his history at the death of Pyrrhus (272 B.C.), but, unfortunately, book xx. of Diodorus' work carries us no farther than 303 B.C., and of the later books we have but scanty fragments. The narrative of Diodorus may be supplemented by the fragments of Arrian's *History of the events after Alexander's Death* (which reach, however, only to 321 B.C.), and by Plutarch's *Lives of Eumenes* and of *Demetrius*. For the rest of the 3rd century and the first half of the 2nd we have his *Lives of Pyrrhus*, of *Aratus*, of *Philopoemen*, and of *Agis and Cleomenes*. For the period from 220 B.C. onwards Polybius is our chief authority. In a period in which the literary sources are so scanty great weight attaches to the epigraphic and numismatic evidence.

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The literature which deals with the history of Greece, in its various periods, departments, and aspects, is of so vast a bulk that all that can be attempted here is to indicate the most important and most accessible works.

General Histories of Greece.—Down to the middle of the 19th century the only histories of Greece deserving of mention were the products of English scholarship. The two earliest of these were published about the same date, towards the end of the 18th century, nearly three-quarters of a century before any history of Greece, other than a mere compendium, appeared on the Continent. John Gillies' *History of Greece* was published in 1786, Mitford's in 1784. Both works were composed with a political bias and a political object. Gillies was a Whig. In the dedication (to George III.) he expresses the view that "the History of Greece exposes the dangerous turbulence of Democracy, and arraigns the despotism of Tyrants, while it evinces the inestimable benefits, resulting to Liberty itself, from the steady operation of well-regulated monarchy." Mitford was a Tory, who thought to demonstrate the evils of democracy from the example of the Athenian state. His *History*, in spite of its bias, was a work of real value. More than fifty years elapsed between Mitford's work and Thirlwall's. Connop Thirlwall, Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, afterwards Bishop of St. David's, brought a sound judgment to the aid of ripe scholarship. His *History of Greece*, published in 1835-1838 (8 vols), is entirely free from the controversial tone of Mitford's volumes. Ten years later (1846) George Grote published the first volumes of his history, which was not completed (in 12 vols.) till 1856. Grote, like Mitford, was a politician—an ardent Radical, with republican sympathies. It was in order to refute the slanders of the Tory partisan that he was impelled to write a history of Greece, which should do justice to the greatest democracy of the ancient world, the Athenian state. Thus, in the case of three of these four writers, the interest in their subject was mainly political. Incom-

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parably the greatest of these works is Grote's. Grote had his faults and his limitations. His prejudices are strong, and his scholarship is weak; he had never visited Greece, and he knew little or nothing of Greek art; and, at the time he wrote, the importance of coins and inscriptions was imperfectly apprehended. In spite of every defect, however, his work is the greatest history of Greece that has yet been written. It is not too much to say that nobody knows Greek history till he has mastered Grote. No history of Greece has since appeared in England on a scale at all comparable to that of Grote's work. The most important of the more recent ones is that by J. B. Bury (1 vol., 1900. New edition, 1919), formerly Fellow of Trinity College, Dublin, afterwards Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge. Mitford and Bury end with the death of Alexander; Gillies and Grote carry on the narrative a generation farther; while Thirlwall's work extends to the absorption of Greece in the Roman Empire (146 B.C.).

While in France the *Histoire des Grecs* (ending at 146 B.C.) of Victor Duruy (new edition, 2 vols., 1883), Minister of Public Instruction under Napoleon III., and the *Histoire de l'Antiquité* (ending at 107 B.C.) of Eugène Cavaignac (3 vols., 1913-19, in progress) are the only ones that need be mentioned, in Germany there has been a succession of histories of Greece since the middle of the 19th century. Kortüm's *Geschichte Griechenlands* (3 vols., 1854), a work of little merit, was followed by Max Duncker's *Geschichte der Griechen* (vols. 1 and 2 published in 1856; vols. 1 and 2, Neue Folge, which bring the narrative down to the death of Pericles, in 1884; the two former volumes form vols. 5, 6 and 7 of his *Geschichte des Altertums*), and by the *Griechische Geschichte* of Ernst Curtius (3 vols., 1857-1867). An English translation of Duncker, by S. F. Alleyne, appeared in 1883 (2 vols., Bentley), and of Curtius, by A. W. Ward (5 vols., Bentley, 1868-1873). Among more recent works may be mentioned the *Griechische Geschichte* of Adolf Holm (4 vols., Berlin, 1886-1894; English translation by F. Clarke, 4 vols., Macmillan, 1894-1898), and histories with the same title by Julius Beloch (3 vols., Strassburg, 1893-1904. 2nd edition, in progress, 1912-1920), and Georg Busolt, (2nd ed., 3 vols., Gotha, 1893-1904). Holm carries on the narrative to 30 B.C., Beloch to 217 B.C., Busolt to Chaeronea (338 B.C.). Busolt's work is entirely different in character from any other history

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of Greece. The writer's object is to refer in the notes (which constitute five-sixths of the book) to the views of every writer in any language upon every controverted question. It is absolutely indispensable, as a work of reference, for any serious study of Greek history. The ablest work since Grote's is Eduard Meyer's *Geschichte des Altertums*, of which 5 vols. (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1884-1902) have appeared, carrying the narrative down to the death of Epaminondas (362 B.C.). Vols. 2-5 are principally concerned with Greek history. It must be remembered that, partly owing to the literary finds and the archaeological discoveries of the last thirty years, and partly owing to the advance made in the study of epigraphy and numismatics, all the histories published before those of Busolt, Beloch, Meyer, and Bury are out of date.

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APPENDIX II.

ARISTOTLE'S

CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS.

The Constitution of Athens (*Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία*), a work attributed to the philosopher Aristotle (384–322 B.C.), formed one of a series of *Constitutions* (*πολιτεῖαι*), 158 in number, which treated of the institutions of the various states in the Greek world. It was extant until the 7th century of our era, or to an even later date, but was subsequently lost. A copy of this treatise, written in four different hands upon four rolls of papyrus, and dating from the end of the 1st century A.D., was discovered in Egypt, and acquired by the trustees of the British Museum, for whom it was edited by F. G. Kenyon, assistant in the manuscript department, and published in January 1891. Some very imperfect fragments of another copy had been acquired by the Egyptian Museum at Berlin, and were published in 1880.

Authorship.

It may be regarded as now established that the treatise discovered in Egypt is identical with the

AUTHORSHIP.

work upon the constitution of Athens that passed in antiquity under the name of Aristotle. The evidence derived from a comparison of the British Museum papyrus with the quotations from the lost work of Aristotle's which are found in scholiasts and grammarians is conclusive. Of fifty-eight quotations from Aristotle's work, fifty-five occur in the papyrus. Of thirty-three quotations from Aristotle, which relate to matters connected with the constitution, or the constitutional history of Athens, although they are not expressly referred to the Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία, twenty-three are found in the papyrus. Of those not found in the papyrus, the majority appear to have come either from the beginning of the treatise, which is wanting in the papyrus, or from the latter portion of it, which is mutilated. The coincidence, therefore, is as nearly as possible complete. It may also be regarded as established by internal evidence that the treatise was composed during the interval between Aristotle's return to Athens in 335 B.C. and his death in 322. There are two passages which give us the latter year as the *terminus ad quem*, viz. c. 42 1 and c. 62. 2. In the former passage the democracy which is about to be described is spoken of as the "present constitution" (ἡ νῦν καταστάσις τῆς πολιτείας). The democratic constitution was abolished, and a timocracy established, on the surrender of Athens to Antipater, at the end of the Lamian War, in the autumn of 322.

CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS.

At the same time Samos was lost ; it is still reckoned, however, among the Athenian possessions in the latter passage. On the other hand, the foreign possessions of Athens are limited to Lemnos, Imbros, Scyros, Delos, and Samos. This could only apply to the period after Chaeronea (338 B.C.). In c. 61. 1, again, mention is made of a special *Strategus ἐπὶ τὰς συμμορίας* ; but it can be proved from inscriptions that down to the year 334 the generals were *collectively* concerned with the symmories. Finally, in c. 54. 7 an event is dated by the archonship of Cephisophon (329). We thus get the years 329 and 322 as fixing the limits of the period to which the composition of the work must be assigned. It follows that, whether it is by Aristotle or not, its date is later than that of the *Politics*, in which there is no reference to any event subsequent to the death of Philip in 336.

The only question as to authorship that can fairly be raised is the question whether it is by Aristotle or by a pupil ; *i.e.* as to the sense in which it is "Aristotelian." The argument on the two sides may be summarized as follows :—

Against.—(i.) The occurrence of non-Aristotelian words and phrases and the absence of turns of expression characteristic of the undisputed writings of Aristotle. (ii.) The occurrence of statements contradictory of views found in the *Politics* ; *e.g.* c. 4

(Constitution of Draco) compared with *Pol.* 1274 b 15 (Δράκοντος νόμοι μὲν εἰσι, πολιτεία δ' ὑπαρχούση τοὺς νόμους ἔθηκεν); c. 8. 1 (the archons appointed by lot out of selected candidates) compared with *Pol.* 1274 a 17, and 1281 b 31 (the archons elected by the *demos*); c. 17 .1 (total length of Peisistratus' reign, 19 years) compared with *Pol.* 1315 b. 32 (total length, 17 years); c. 21. 6 (Cleisthenes left the clan and phratries unaltered) compared with *Pol.* 1319 b 20 (Cleisthenes increased the number of the phratries); c. 21 2 and 4 compared with *Pol.* 1275 b 37 (different views as to the class admitted to citizenship by Cleisthenes). It will be observed that the instances quoted relate to the most famous names in the early history of Athens, viz. Draco, Solon, Peisistratus, and Cleisthenes. (iii.) Arguments drawn from the style, composition, and general character of the work, which are alleged to be unworthy of the author of the undoubtedly genuine writings. There is no sense of proportion (contrast the space devoted to Peisistratus and his sons, or to the Four Hundred and the Thirty, with the inadequate treatment of the period between the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars); there is a lack of historical insight and an uncritical acceptance of erroneous views; and the anecdotic element is unduly prominent. These considerations led several of the earlier critics to deny the Aristotelian authorship, e.g. the editors of the Dutch edition of the text,

van Herwerden and van Leeuwen ; Rühl, Cauer and Schvarcz in Germany ; H. Richards and others in England.

For.—(i.) The consensus of antiquity. Every ancient writer who mentions the *Constitution* attributes it to Aristotle, while no writer is known to have questioned its genuineness. (ii.) The coincidence of the date assigned to its composition on internal grounds with the date of Aristotle's second residence in Athens. (iii.) Parallelisms of thought or expression with passages in the *Politics* ; e.g. c. 16. 2 and 3 compared with *Pol.* 1318 b 14 and 1319 a 30 ; the general view of Solon's legislation compared with *Pol.* 1296 b. 1 ; c. 27. 3 compared with *Pol.* 1274 a 9. To argument (i.) against the authorship, it is replied that the *Constitution* is an historical work, intended for popular use ; differences in style and terminology from those of a philosophical treatise, such as the *Politics*, are to be expected. To argument (ii.) it is replied that, as the *Constitution* is a later work than the *Politics*, a change of view upon particular points is not surprising. These considerations have led the great majority of writers upon the subject to attribute the work to Aristotle himself. On this side are found Kenyon and Sandys among English scholars, and in Germany, Wilamowitz, Blass, Gilbert, Bauer, Bruno Keil, Busolt, E. Meyer, and many others. On the whole, it can

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hardly be doubted that the view which is supported by so great a weight of authority is the correct one. The arguments advanced on the other side are not to be lightly set aside, but they can scarcely outweigh the combination of external and internal evidence in favour of the attribution to Aristotle. An attentive study of the parallel passages in the *Politics* will go a long way towards carrying conviction. It is true that a series such as the *Constitution* might well be entrusted to pupils working under the direction of their master. It is also true, however, that the *Constitution of Athens* must have been incomparably the most important of the series and the one that would be most naturally reserved for the master's hand. There are no traces in the treatise either of variety of authorship or of incompleteness, though there are evidences of interpolation.

Contents.

The treatise consists of two parts, one historical, and the other descriptive. The first forty-one chapters compose the former part, the remainder of the work the latter. The first part comprised an account of the original constitution of Athens, and of the eleven changes through which it successively passed (see c. 41). The papyrus, however, is imperfect at the beginning (the manuscript from which it was copied appears to have been similarly defective).

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the text commencing in the middle of a sentence which relates to the trial and banishment of the Alcmeonidae for their part in the affair of Cylon. The missing chapters must have contained a sketch of the original constitution, and of the changes introduced in the time of Ion and Theseus.

The following is an abstract of Part I. in its present form. Chapters 2, 3, description of the constitution before the time of Draco. 4, Draco's constitution. 5-12, reforms of Solon. 13, party feuds after the legislation of Solon. 14-19, the rule of Peisistratus and his sons. 20, 21, the reforms of Cleisthenes. 22, changes introduced between Cleisthenes and the invasion of Xerxes. 23, 24, the supremacy of the Areopagus, 479-461 B.C. 24, its overthrow by Ephialtes. 26, 27, changes introduced in the time of Pericles. 28, the rise of the demagogues. 29-33, the revolution of the Four Hundred. 34-40, the government of the Thirty. 41, list of the successive changes in the constitution. It may be noted that the reforms of Solon, the tyranny of Peisistratus and his sons, and the revolutions of the Four Hundred and the Thirty, together occupy considerably more than two-thirds of Part I.

Part II. describes the constitution as it existed at the period of the composition of the treatise (329-322 B.C.). It begins with an account of the conditions of citizenship and of the training of the *ephebi* (citizens

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between the ages of 18 and 20). In chapters 43-49 the functions of the Council (*βουλή*) and of the officials who act in concert with it are described. 50-60 deal with the officials who are appointed by lot, of whom the most important are the nine Archons, to whose functions five chapters (55-59) are devoted. The military officers, who come under the head of elective officials, form the subject of c. 61. With c. 63 begins the section on the Law-courts, which occupied the remainder of the *Constitution*. This portion, with the exception of c. 63, is fragmentary in character, owing to the mutilated condition of the fourth roll of the papyrus on which it was written. It will thus be seen that the subjects which receive the fullest treatment in Part II. are the Council, the Archons, and the Law-courts. The Ecclesia, on the other hand, is dealt with very briefly, in connexion with the *prytaneis* and *proedri* (cc. 43, 44).

Sources.

The labours of several workers in this field, notably Bruno Keil and Wilamowitz, have rendered it comparatively easy to form a general estimate of Aristotle's indebtedness to previous writers, although problems of great difficulty are encountered as soon as it is attempted to determine the precise sources from which the historical part of the work is derived. Among these sources are un-

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questionably Herodotus (for the tyranny of Peisistratus, and for the struggle between Cleisthenes and Isagoras), Thucydides (for the episode of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, and for the Four Hundred), Xenophon (for the Thirty), and the poems of Solon. There is now among critics a general consensus in favour of the view that the most important of his sources was the *Atthis* of Androtion, a work published in all probability only a few years earlier than the *Constitution*; in any case, after the year 346. From it are derived not only the passages which are annalistic in character and read like excerpts from a chronicle (e.g. c. 13. 1, 22; c. 22; c. 26. 2, 3), but also most of the matter common to the *Constitution* and to Plutarch's *Solon*. The coincidences with Plutarch, which are often verbal, and extend to about 50 lines out of 170 in cc. 5-11 of the *Constitution*, can best be explained on the hypothesis that Hermippus, the writer followed by Plutarch, used the same source as Aristotle, viz. the *Atthis* of Androtion. Androtion is probably closely followed in the account of the pre-Draconian constitution, and to him appear to be due the explanation of local names (e.g. χωρίον ἀτελής), or proverbial expressions (e.g. τὸ μὴ φυλοκρινεῖν), as well as the account of "strategems" such as that of Themistocles against the Areopagus (c. 25) or that employed by Peisistratus in order to disarm the people (c. 15.4). Whether the anecdotes, which are a conspicuous

SOURCES.

feature in the *Constitution*, should be referred to the same source is more open to doubt. It is also generally agreed that among the sources was a work, written towards the end of the 5th century B.C., by an author of oligarchical sympathies, with the object of defaming the character and policy of the heroes of the democracy. This source can be traced in passages such as c. 6. 2 (Solon turning the *Seisachtheia* to the profit of himself and his friends), 9. 2 (obscurity of Solon's laws intentional, cf. c. 35. 2), 27. 4 (Pericles' motive for the introduction of the dicasts' pay). But while the object (οἱ βουλόμενοι βλασφημεῖν, c. 6) and the date of this oligarchical pamphlet (for the date cf. Plutarch's *Solon*, c. 15: οἱ περὶ Κόνωνα καὶ Κλειρίαν καὶ Ἰπ-πόνηκον, which points to a time when Conon, Alcibiades and Callias were prominent in public life) are fairly certain, the authorship is quite uncertain, as is also its relationship to another source of importance, viz. that from which are derived the accounts of the Four Hundred and the Thirty. The view taken of the character and course of these revolutions betrays a strong bias in favour of Theramenes, whose ideal is alleged to have been the *πάτριος πολιτεία*. It has been maintained, on the one hand, that this last source (the authority followed in the accounts of the Four Hundred and the Thirty) is identical with the oligarchical pamphlet, and, on the other, that it is none other than the *Atthis* of Androtion. The former

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hypothesis is improbable. In favour of the latter two arguments may be adduced. In the first place, Androtion's father, Andron, was one of the Four Hundred, and took Theramenes' side. Secondly, the precise marks of time, which are characteristic of the *Atthis*, are conspicuous in these chapters. In view, however, of the fact that Androtion in his political career showed himself not only a democrat, but a democrat of the extreme school, the hypothesis must be pronounced untenable.

Value.

It is by no means easy to convey a just impression of the value of Aristotle's work as an authority for the constitutional history of Athens. In all that relates to the practice of his own day Aristotle's authority is final. There can be no question, therefore, as to the importance, or the trustworthy character, of the Second Part. But even here a caution is necessary. It must be remembered that its authority is final for the 4th century only, and that we are not justified in arguing from the practice of the 4th century to that of the 5th, unless corroborative evidence is available. In the First Part, however, where he is treating of the institutions and practice of a past age, Aristotle's authority is very far from being final. An analysis of this part of the work discloses his dependence, in a remarkable

VALUE.

degree, upon his sources. Occasionally he compares, criticizes or combines ; as a rule, he adheres closely to the writer whom he is using. There is no evidence, either of independent inquiry or of the utilization of other sources than literary ones. Where " original documents " are quoted, or referred to, as *e.g.* in the history of the Four Hundred, or of the Thirty, it is probable that he derived them from a previous writer. For the authority of Aristotle we must substitute, therefore, the authority of his sources ; *i.e.* the value of any particular statement will vary with the character of the source from which it comes. For the history of the 5th century the passages which come from Androtion's *Atthis* carry with them a high degree of authority. It by no means follows, however, that a statement relating to earlier times is to be accepted simply because it is derived from the same source. And in passages which are derived from other sources than the *Atthis* a much lower degree of authority can be claimed, even for statements relating to the 5th century. The supremacy of the Areopagus after the Persian Wars, the policy attributed to Aristides (c. 24), and the association of Themistocles with Ephialtes, are cases in point. Nor must the reader expect to find in the *Constitution* a great work, in any sense of the term. The style, it is true, is simple and clear, and the writer's criticisms are sensible. But the reader will look in vain for evidence of the

philosophic insight which makes the *Politics*, even at the present day, the best text-book of political philosophy. It is perhaps hardly too much to say that there is not a single great idea in the whole work. He will look in vain, too, for any consistent view of the history of the constitution as a whole, or for any adequate account of its development. He will find occasional misunderstandings of measures, and confusions of thought. There are appreciations which it is difficult to accept, and inaccuracies which it is difficult to pardon. There are contradictions which the author has overlooked, and there are omissions which are unaccountable. Yet, in spite of such defects, the importance of the *Constitution* can hardly be exaggerated. Its recovery has rendered obsolete any history of the Athenian constitution that was written before the year 1891. Before this date our knowledge was largely derived from the statements of scholiasts and lexicographers which had not seldom been misunderstood. The recovery of the *Constitution* puts us for the first time in possession of the evidence. To appreciate the difference that has been made by its recovery, it is only necessary to compare what we now know of the reforms of Cleisthenes with what we formerly knew. It is much of it evidence that needs a careful process of weighing and sifting before it can be safely used ; but it is, as a rule, the best, or the only evidence. The First Part may be less trustworthy than the Second ; it is not less indispensable to the student of constitutional history.

Bibliography.

A conspectus of the literature of the *Constitution* complete down to the end of 1912 is given in Sandys (2nd edition), pp. lxxx.—xci., and, though less complete, down to the beginning of 1895 in Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*, 2nd ed., vol. ii. p. 15. In the present article only the most important editions, works or articles are mentioned.

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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

B.C.

- | | |
|---------|--|
| 1183 | Fall of Troy. |
| 1124 | Thessali conquer Thessaly, and Boeoti
Boeotia. |
| 1104 | Return of the Heraclidae.
(Dorian Migration.)
[The date of Pheidon of Argos is quite un-
certain. The dates which are assigned to
him by ancient writers vary from the
beginning of the 9th to the middle of the
6th century B.C. Modern authorities incline
to place him either in the middle of the 8th
century or in the middle of the 7th century
B.C.] |
| 776 | First Olympiad. |
| 743—724 | First Messenian War. |
| 735 | Foundation of Naxos, first Sicilian colony. |
| 734 | Foundation of Corcyra and Syracuse. |
| 721 | Foundation of Sybaris. |
| 668 | Argive victory over Spartans at Hysiae. |
| 660 | Tyranny of Orthagoridae at Sicyon begins. |
| 655 | Tyranny of Cypselidae at Corinth begins. |
| 648—631 | Second Messenian War. |
| 625 | Accession of Periander, tyrant of Corinth. |

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

621	Legislation of Draco. [The tyranny of Cleisthenes at Sicyon falls between 600 and 560 B.C.]
594	Reforms of Solon.
591	First Sacred War.
585	Death of Periander. Alliance of Alyattes and Cyaxares.
569	Accession of Amasis in Egypt.
560	First tyranny of Peisistratus. Accession of Croesus in Lydia.
560—550	Spartan Conquest of Tegea and Thyreatis.
546	Fall of Sardis.
(?)	Polycrates tyrant of Samos. ¹
527	Death of Peisistratus.
525	Persian Conquest of Egypt. Spartan and Corinthian Expedition against Samos.
523	Death of Polycrates.
521	Accession of Darius.
520 (?)	Accession of Cleomenes at Sparta. ²
519	Alliance of Athens with Plataea.
512 (?)	Scythian Expedition.
510	Expulsion of Hippias. Destruction of Sybaris.
508	Reforms of Cleisthenes.

¹ The precise date at which Polycrates became tyrant is uncertain. It falls between 545 and 532.

² Cleomenes came to the throne before 519. The precise date is uncertain.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

506	Athenian defeat of Boeotians and Chalcidians.
504 (?)	Congress at Sparta to restore Hippias.
501	Institution of the Ten Strategi at Athens.
499	Ionic Revolt (499—494).
497 (?)	Burning of Sardis.
494	Battle of Lade. Suppression of the Revolt. Defeat of Argives by Cleomenes at Sepeia.
493	Archonship of Themistocles. Return of Miltiades from the Chersonese. First Trial of Miltiades.
492	Wreck of Mardonius' expedition off Mt. Athos. Expedition of Datis and Artaphernes.
490	Battle of Marathon.
490 or 489	Parian Expedition.
489	Death of Cleomenes. Second Trial and Death of Miltiades. Archonship of Aristides.
488	Outbreak of war between Athens and Aegina (488—481).
487	Introduction of Lot in appointment of Archons.
485	Death of Darius. Accession of Xerxes.
484	Ostracism of Xanthippus.
482	Ostracism of Aristides.

- 480 Expedition of Xerxes.**
 Battles of Artemisium, Thermopylae, and
 Salamis.
 Cathaginian Invasion of Sicily. Battle of
 Himera.
- 479 Battles of Plataea and Mycale.
 478 Capture of Sestos by the Athenians.
477 Foundation of Confederacy of Delos.
 475 Capture of Eion by Cimon.
 474 Hiero's Victory over the Etruscans at Cumae
 473—466 Conquest of Scyrus and Carystus.
 Revolt of Naxos.
 Battle of the Eurymedon.¹
- 472—466 Battles of Tegea and Dipaea.²
 465 Revolt of Thasos.
 464 Earthquake at Sparta.
 Revolt of the Helots.
 463 Reduction of Thasos.
 462 Cimon's Expedition to Ithome.
 462 or 461 Alliance of Athens with Argos and Thessaly.
 461 Ostracism of Cimon.
 Areopagus deprived of its powers by
 Ephialtes.
 Assassination of Ephialtes.
- 460 Outbreak of First Peloponnesian War (460—
 451).**

¹ The order of the events is certain, the precise dates uncertain.

² These two battles fell between these dates. Their precise dates are uncertain.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

- 459 Athenian Expedition to Egypt (459-454).
Battles of Halieis and Cecryphalea.
- 458 Victory of Myronides over the Corinthians
in the Megarid.
- 457 Battles of Tanagra and Oenophyta.
Admission of the Zeugites to the Archonship.
- 454 Destruction of the Athenian Expedition in
Egypt.
Transfer of Treasury of League from Delos
to Athens.
- 451 **Five years Truce between Athens and Sparta.**
Thirty Years Truce between Sparta and
Argos.
Pericles' Law of Citizenship.
- 450-49 Cimon's Expedition to Cyprus.
Death of Cimon.
- 447 or 446 Battle of Coronea.
- 446 Revolt of Euboea.
Peloponnesian Invasion of Attica.
- 445 **Thirty Years Peace.**
- 443 Foundation of Thurii.
- 440 Revolt of Samos.
- 436 Foundation of Amphipolis.
- 435 Outbreak of War between Corcyra and
Corinth.
- 433 Alliance of Athens and Corcyra.
Battle of Sybota.
- 432 Revolt of Potidaea.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

- 432 Assembly of Peloponnesian Allies at Sparta
votes for War.
- 431—404 PELOPONNESIAN WAR.**
- 431—421 Archidamian War.**
- 431 First Year.
Theban Attack on Plataea.
First Peloponnesian Invasion of Attica.
Expulsion of Aeginetans from Aegina.
- 430 Second Year.
Outbreak of Plague.
Second Invasion of Attica.
Pericles deposed, tried, fined, and re-
appointed Strategus.
Surrender of Potidaea.
- 429 Third Year.
Siege of Plataea begins.
Naval victories of Phormio in Gulf of
Corinth.
Death of Pericles.
Battle of Spartolus.
- 428 Fourth Year.
Third Invasion of Attica.
Revolt of Lesbos.
Eisphora imposed at Athens.
- 427 Fifth Year.
Fourth Invasion of Attica.
Surrender of Mitylene.
Fall of Plataea.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

- 427 *Stasis* in Corcyra.
First Sicilian Expedition under Laches (427—424).
- 426 Sixth Year.
Foundation of Spartan Colony of Heraclea.
Aetolian Expedition of Demosthenes.
Battle of Olpae.
- 425 Seventh Year.
Fifth Invasion of Attica.
Pylos and Sphacteria.
Raising of the Tribute.
- 424 Eighth Year.
Congress of Gela.
End of First Sicilian Expedition.
Failure of Athenian Plot for Capture of Megara.
Capture of Cythera by Nicias.
Battle of Delium.
Expedition of Brasidas to Thrace.
- 423 Ninth Year.
Truce of Laches.
- 422 Tenth Year.
Battle of Amphipolis.
Death of Brasidas and Cleon.
- 421 **Peace of Nicias. End of Archidamian War.**
Treaty of Alliance between Athens and Sparta.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

- 420 Alliance of Athens with Argos, Elis, and Mantinea.
- 418 Battle of Mantinea.
- 417 Ostracism of Hyperbolus.
- 416 Capture of Melos.
- 415—413 Great Sicilian Expedition.**
- 415 Expedition sails.
Recall of Alcibiades.
- 414 Siege of Syracuse. Arrival of Gylippus.
- 413 Spartan Occupation of Decelea.
Arrival of Demosthenes with reinforcements.
Battle in Great Harbour.
Destruction of the Expedition.
- 412—404 Decelean or Ionian War.**
- 412 General Revolt of the Subject-Allies.
Treaties between Sparta and Persia.
Alcibiades deserts the Spartan side.
- 411 Revolution of the Four Hundred.**
- Revolt of Euboea.
Battle of Cynossema.
- 410 Battle of Cyzicus.
Rejection of Spartan Peace Proposals.
- 409 Carthaginian Invasion of Sicily.
- 407 Return of Alcibiades to Athens.
Battle of Notium.
Deposition of Alcibiades.
- 406 Battle of Arginusae. Trial of the Generals.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

- 406 Rejection of Spartan Peace Proposals.
- 405 Battle of Aegospotami.
Dionysius the Elder becomes Tyrant of
Syracuse (405—367).
- 404 **Surrender of Athens. End of the Pelo-**
ponnesian War.
The Thirty established.
- 403 Fall of the Thirty.
- 403—2 Archonship of Euclides.
- 401 March of the Ten Thousand. Battle of
Cunaxa.
- 400—387 **War of Sparta with Persia.**
- 400 Thimbron in Asia Minor.
Dercyllidas succeeds Thimbron
War of Sparta and Elis.
- 399 Death of Socrates.
- 398 Accession of Agesilaus.
- 397 Conon commander of Persian Fleet.
Conspiracy of Cinadon.
- 396 First Campaign of Agesilaus in Asia Minor.
- 395 Second and Third Campaigns of Agesilaus.
Death of Tissaphernes.
Boeotian War.
Battle of Haliartus and Death of Lysander.
- 395—387 **Corinthian War.**
- 394 Battles of Corinth, Cnidus, and Coronea.
- 390 Destruction of Spartan *mora* by Iphicrates.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

- 389 Successes of Thrasybulus in the Hellespont
and Aegean. ,
- 388 Death of Thrasybulus.
- 387 Peace of Antalcidas.**
- 385 *Dioecismus* of Mantinea.
Spartan seizure of the Cadmea.
- 382 Spartan Expedition against Olynthus.
- 379 Olynthus makes peace with Sparta.
Suppression of the Chalcidian League.
Expulsion of the Spartans from the Cadmea.
- 378 Raid of Sphodrias.
Alliance of Athens and Thebes.
Agesilaus' Invasion of Boeotia.
- 377 Foundation of Second Athenian Confederacy.**
- 376 Battle of Naxos.
- 375 Battle of Tegyra.
Victory of Timotheus at Alyzia.
- 374 Peace between Athens and Sparta.
- 373 Periplus of Iphicrates. Trial of Timotheus.
- 371 Peace of Callias.
Battle of Leuctra.
Foundation of the Arcadian League.
- 370 Death of Jason of Pherae.
Restoration of Mantinea.
- 369 Accession of Alexander of Pherae (369—
357).
Foundation of Messene.
Alliance of Athens and Sparta.


CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

- 369 Theban Invasion of the Peloponnese.
368 Tearless Battle.
367 Death of Dionysius the Elder.
366 Theban Invasion of the Peloponnese.
364 Naval Expedition of Epaminondas.
Battle of Cynoscephalae.
Death of Pelopidas.
362 **Battle of Mantinea. Death of Epaminondas.**
359 **Accession of Philip. (359—336).**
357 **Outbreak of Social War (357—354).**
Death of Chabrias.
Expedition of Dion to Sicily.
Capture of Amphipolis by Philip.
Death of Alexander of Pherae.
356 **Outbreak of Sacred War (356—346).**
Philomelus seizes Delphi
354 End of the Social War.
Defeat of the Phocians at Neon.
Death of Philomelus.
Murder of Dion.
353 Onomarchus expels Philip from Thessaly.
352 Defeat and Death of Onomarchus.
349 Alliance of Athens with Olynthus.
348 Philip's Capture of Olynthus.
346 **Peace of Philocrates.**
End of the Sacred War.
Punishment of Phocis.
344 Expedition of Timoleon.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

- 340 Siege of Perinthus and Byzantium.
339 Battle of the Crimissus.
338 Battle of Chaeronea.
336 Assassination of Philip.
Accession of Alexander (336—323).
335 Destruction of Thebes.
Accession of Darius Codomannus.
334 Alexander Crosses the Hellespont.
Battle of the Granicus.
Sieges of Miletus and Halicarnassus.
333 Battle of Issus.
332 Sieges of Tyre and Gaza.
Conquest of Egypt.
331 Foundation of Alexandria.
Battle of Arbela.
Battle of Megalopolis.
330 Death of Darius.
327 Marriage of Alexander and Roxana.
326 Battle of the Hydaspes.
323 Death of Alexander.
Outbreak of the Lamian War.
322 End of the Lamian War.
Death of Demosthenes.

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
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